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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
Phillip Duane Flieger appeals from the Order Dismissing Petition For Post
Conviction Relief, Granting the State's Motion For Summary Dismissal,

entered

January 14, 2013. Appellant was originally found guilty after a jury trial of
Three (3) counts of Possession of a controlled substance and sentenced to three
Ten (10) Year to Life sentences, concurrent. Appellant appealed his conviction and
sentence prior to the filing of his post-convictin.

The Appellant raised numerous

issues of constitutional error all premised on and due to, Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel, prior to trial, during trial, and on appeal.
appeal

now here,

along

with

the

court's

error and

Those issues are on

abuse of

discretion

in

dismissing the petition •.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
For the Record, the Petitioner-Appellant disputes the factual

findings and

assertions of the State, the court, and those made by all appointed counsel,
including appellate counsel. (Appellant has never been found guilty of intent to
deliver,

and never consented to any searches,

and never waived

any

rights,

including right to speedy trial. )any comments made by any party to the contrary
are false and prejudicial.

Furthermore, Appellant makes a federal claim, giving

notice of same in his pleadings at every instance.

Appellant also makes an actual

innocence claim, asking for a full and fair review of the facts and documents
submitted for review by Appellant to support that claim.
The Appellant gives a full and complete account of the facts in his 'Affidavit
In Support of Petition For Post-Conviction Relief

(Seer

Clerks Record Docket

#40690 page 18 to page 71, Idaho Supreme Court). These facts are attached to this
Brief as Exhibit #A, and are meant to support the claims and issues in the brief
and are referred to in full as if fully contained herein (attached).
The Petitioner-Appellant's issues were all raised pursuant to an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, during the course of these proceedings the petitioner
filed an Exhibit which was a pro-se appeal brief (See? Exhibit #68) which he had
filed in his direct appeal when appeallate counsel, Justin Curtis refused to raise
those issues mandated by Idaho Law be raised on direct appeal or be forfeit. Due
to this madate, the appellant at the time, repeatedly asked counsel to raise the
issues on direct appeal, when counsel refused to, and also committed other fatal
errors in the appeal, such as telling the Supreme Court he was found guilty of
intent to deliver when it was only possession, appellant had no choice but to file
to preserve his right to appeal. The pro-se brief was rejected by the Clerk of the
l

Court due to appellant haveing counsel.
exhibit

and

evidence

(not

as

This same brief was submitted as an

argument)

Petitioner-Appellant's Post-Conviction.

The

in

the

present

brief was submitted

case
as

with

proof

of

appellate counsel's failure to raise the issues on direct appeal, and therefore
supportive of Petitioner's ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel's
claims. The district court denied petitioner •·s augmentation and exhibit. When
Appellant tried to submit the brief and get it augmented to the Idaho Supreme
Court, it was denied again, even though it is part of the clerks record (page
#460-601). This is an impermissible impediment by the state to deny a full and
fair

adjudication

of

Petitioner-Appellant's

claims,

concerning

ineffective

assistance of counsel.
Also suppressed by the government

in

this

case

is

evidence

supporting

Petitioner-Appellant'sa actual innocence, (Affidavit's of Robert Berry)(Exhibit #1
and Exhibit #2, which is Berry's written confession and sworn testimony). This

is

the evidence that was withheld from the jury at trial. (see RC-18 to 71).
Petitioner-Appellant •·s version of the facts, which are supported by evidence
submitted to the trial court but withheld from the jury arez
Mr. Flieger loaned his truck to an individual named Robert Berry, whom than
used it with another man Berry described as Juan. Berry than, along with juan used
drugs at verious locations and while using the truck. They than left the drugs in
the truck in a bag they seen on the floorboard that was already there. when Mr.
Flieger reobtained the vehicle he was pulled over that same day under suspicious
circumstances (Appellant alleges stalking). Upon an illegal search narcotics were
found and evidence was tainted and later destroyed. Mr. Flieger was charged and
held for trial. When Flieger asked that fingerprints be taken and denied the drugs
were his, the items with fingerprints were destroyed. When Mr. Flieger tried to
submit testimony from the owners of the narcotics, it was suppressed. When Mr.
Flieger refused to waive his speedy trial rights, due to the need to have the
witnesses available and testify, his rights were waived in secret, without his
consent. In the interval while awaiting a new trial date, the county sheriff

did

transfer one of Appellant •·s witnesses out of the country. (Juan). When the only
and true remaining accomplice attempted to submit an Affidavit

(Sworn)

to his

exact involvement in the crime, not only was it withheld from the jury by the
trial court, but the court even threatened the deputy sheriff, S~acy Thomas
notarizing the affidavit. When the same witness,

Robert

Berry,

, for

attempted to

testify at trial, after lawful notice and listing, the trial court stopped the
trial, deposed Berry outside the hearing of the jury, threatened him, and when he
2

was leaving the courtroom after testifying at deposition, the state threatened
Berry outside the door of the courtroom with prosecution if he continued to
testify. These incident's were witnessed by counsel, objected to, put on record,
and at all

times

properly and

fairly presented

to

the court.

After

being

threatened, Berry took the plead the fifth amendment in front of the jury, his
affidavit was withheld, his testimony picked apart and partially read to the jury,
and the jury was informed by the state and the court not to believe his testimony
which proved the innocence of the Petitioner-Appellant. These

errors

prejudiced

the Appellant, violate his right to a fair trial, and denied the jury the right to
determine the truth.
When

the

jury

ignored

the

charge of

Intent

to Deliver,

and

found

the

'defendant' guilty only of possession on all three counts, both the state and the
court ignored this verdict at sentencing, reaccused Flieger of Intent to Deliver,
and

sentenced

him

accordingly,

committing

double

jeopardy,

and

violating

Appellant's substantive rights to due process of law.
The Appellant provides the Court with specific recitation and references to
the record in his Exhibit 's; and below, but more concisely in the Affidavit In
Support (RC-18 thru 71) (Exhibit A).
Appellant provides the Court with

Along with this initial Brief on Appeal,
a

complete Exhibit

file

submitted

in his

post-conviction petition (Attached).
The district court denied augmentation and judicial notice in part, but this
is in error. As the preliminary argument shows (below)

it

is mandated

that

petitioner's submit affidavits; evidence; exhibits; and supporting documents with
their petitions.
Appellant

was

denied

an

evidentiary

hearing,

only

a

summary

judgment

proceeding, where his witnesses were not allowed, and evidence was not permitted.
The state of course presented evidence, disputing petitioner•·s claims, but the
record provided to this Court clearly shows that the district court made an
unreasonable determination of the facts, and rullings contrary to United States
Supreme Court precedent, as well as contradicting Idaho's own mandates. See below.
The Appellant points out that state created impediments of the evidence and
facts that support Appellant's claims, is unconstitutional, reviewable, and in all
instances, an exhaustion of the claims pursuant to the AEDPA and PLRA. Appellant
is only required to 'give the state an opportunity' he can not force them to take
that opportunity. Herein and below is their opportunity.
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PRELIMINARY ARGUMENT

1.

DID THE DISTRICT CJURT ERROR IN DISMISSING MY PETITION FOR
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, ERROR IN DENYING AFFIDAVIT'S, EXHIBIT'S, AND
EVIDENCE SUPPORTING T~E PETITION, AND IS THIS FUNDAMENTAL PLAIN ERROR
DENYING FAIR DUE PROCESSES PURSUANT TO STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW STANDARDS?
THE APPELLANT ASSERTS YES!

A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A petition for post-conviction relief proceeding is civil in nature,

and

accordingly requires proof by the preponderance of the evidence to prevail. I.e. §
19-4907; Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 8 P.3d 636 (2000). Moreover, with but few
exceptions, it is the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure which govern these types of
matters. I.C.R.

57(b); Ferrier v.

State,

135 Idaho 797,

25 P.3d llO

(2001);

Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454, 808 P.2d 373 (1991); Mathews v. State, 130 Idaho
39, 936 P.2d 682 (Ct.App.1997).
The petition must containt (a) much more than 'a short and plain statement of
the claim, as required under I.R.C.P. 89(a)(l); and, (b) it must be verified with
respect to those facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and those
affidavits,

records,

or other evidence supporting

its allegations are

to

be

attached, or their absence explained." martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813,816, 892
P.2d 488,491 (COA 1995), and I.e.§ 19-4903; Labelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115,117,
937 P.2d 427,429 (Ct.App.1997).
In other words,

the Petitioner must make factual allegations showing each

essential element of the claim, and a showing of admissible evidence must support
those factual allegations. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644.647, 873 P.2d 898,901
(COA 1994); Stone v. State, 108 Idaho 822,824, 702 P.2d 860,862 (COA 1985); and
Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612,617, 651 P.2d 546,551 *C:JA 1982). Still, those
factual allegations contained within the petition or its verified attachments are
deemed to be true until controverted. Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 531 P.2d 1187
(1975); Roman, at 647.
Further,

t!1e district court may take judicial notice of the record of the

underlying criminal case in the course of reaching a decision. Hays v. State, 113
Idaho 736,739, 745 P.2d 758,761 (COA 1987), aff'd ll5 Idaho 315, 766 P.2d 785
(1988), and State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 842 P.2d 660 (1992), overruled on
other grounds. The Idaho Supreme Court exercises free review of the district
court's application of the relevant law to the facts. Dunlap v. State, 141

Idaho

50, at 56, 106 P.3d at 382; Mckinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695,699--700, 992 P.2d
144,148-49 (1999); Queen v. State, 146 Idaho 502, at 504, 198 P.3d 731, at 733.
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Until allegations contained in a verified application are controverted by the
state, they are deemed to be true for the purposes of determining whether :m
evidentiary hearing should be held. Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 531 P.2d 1187
(1975); Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 741 P.2d 374 (Ct.App.1987). The issue on
appeal from the dismissal of an application is whether the application alleges
facts which, if true, would entitle the applicant to relief. Whitehawk v. State,
116 Idaho 831, 780 P.2d 153 (Ct.App.1989).
When the applicant's evidence has raised genuine issues of material fact that,
if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle him to the relief requested,
if such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted.
Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759,763, 819 P.2d 1159,1163 (Ct.App.1991).
An innocent prisoner seeking collateral relief through post-conviction
h3beas corpus should include a forthri:3ht

claim of

innocence.

Seei

or

Comment,

Federal habeas 2orpusz The Relevance of Petitioner's Innocence, 46 UMKC L.Rev. 382
(1978);

Alsoi

Peller,

In

Defense of

Federal

Habeas Corpus Relitigation,

16

harv.Civ.Rts.-Civ.Lib.L.Rev. 579 (1982)(presenting an extensive argument in favor
of post-conviction review).
The purpose behind the requirement in I.e.§ 19-4907(a) is that the trial court
make specific findings of fact and expressly state its conclusions of law on each
issue, is to afford the Appellate Court an adequate basis upon which to assess any
appeal arising from the denial of a petition. Maxfield v. State, 108 Idaho 493,
700 P.2d 115 (Ct.App.1985).
Where genuine issues of material fact exist, an evidentiary hearing must be
held. Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 835 P.2d 661 (Ct.App.1992). In the present
case, the Appellant received no evidentioary hearing and no memorandum decisiJn or
opinion was issued after the summary judgment hearing. Appellant has only been
provided with a transcript of the hearing. Seei Exhibit #B. Furthermore, due to
the fact an evidentiary hearing was denied, and summary judgment proceedings held,
any CJmment by the court regarding the facts alleged in Appellant's verified
Affidavit (Exhibit A) and supported by his Exhibit' s numbered l

thru 96),

is

arguably one sided, and an abuse of descretion.
The remedies fro post-conviction relief, ... , are carried out by reopening the
criminal case and conducting further proceedings in that case. State v. Law, 131
Idaho 90,

952 P.2d 905

(Ct.App.1997).

The obvious prejudicial nature of

the

proceedings undermined the truth-finding process. seei Stricklan v. Washington,
466 u.s. at 691, 104 s.ct. at 2066.
5

'l'he Appellant points out that the district court denied augmentation

and

judicial notice purposefully to prevent establishing the truth of Appellant's
claims. However,

the hearing

(See?

Exhibit C-:Q Transcript of augmentation and

judicial notice hearing), was a clear abuse of discretion, and fundamental error.
Appellant argues that although a theory is not vi9orously pursued (attended) in a
proceeding, if it is at least asserted it is sufficiently presented to allow a
defendant to continue with it on appeal without running afoul of the general rule
against asserting new theories on appeal. e.g., Masters v. State, 105 Idaho 197,
668 P.2d 73 (1983).

(Exhibit Dis attached) (Exhbit C, Attached)

:Furthermore, failure to obtain a ruling on an issue below may not be fatal in
a criminal case if the issue relates to "fundamental error.
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And in particular

where the state engages in unethical and improper procedures to all out prevent
any issue being either properly answered or provided evidentiary. e.g., State v.
haggard, 94 Idaho 249, 486 P.2d 260 (1971).
Where the Appellant rasied g,~nuine issues of material fact, which were controverted by the state, but was not allowed to present that evidence at a hearing, it
was an abuse of descretion and fundamental plain error. If an application raises
material issues of fact, the district court must conduct an evidentiary hearing
and make specific fi1dings of fact on each such issue. Sanchez v. State, 127 Idaho
709,

905 P.2d 642

(Ct.App.1395).

And matters

outside

the record

cannot

be

considered on appeal but must be raised by application under Post-Conviction
Procedures Act. State v. Congdon, 96 Idaho 377, 529 P.2d 773 (1974).
it is error for the trial court to grant summarily dismissal of the petition
sibnce there were questions of material fact present. State v. Goodrich, 104 Idaho
469, 660 P.2d 934 (1983).

And where the district court's notice of proposed

dismissal merely recited the language of I .c. § 19-4901 et

seq,

and did

not

identify with any particularity why the petitioner's evidence or legal theories
were deemed to be deficient, the notice was inadequate as a ~atter of law. Downing
v. State, 132 Idaho 861, 979 P.2d 1219 (Ct.App.1999).
On the record, material questions of fact were in dispute, because these facts
were in di.spute, the district court's order dismissing the case must be reversed.
Idaho v. Horiuchi,

F.3d

(9th Cir. June 5, 2001), No. 98-30149.

The .1\ppellant points out that he made a federal claim on ea:h issue raised.
And supported all claims with a MemorandJm In Support (RC-page 72 thru 159). he
did

in

fact

provide a

federal

case

cite

argument

at

every

level

of

the

proceedings, including responses objections and Notice of Appeal. It is therefore
q:g:::priate to raise those federal claims here.
6

App2llant argues that a defendant may challenge the constitutionality of his
conviction on direct appeal, in post-conviction proceedings available under state
law, and in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Daniels v. U.S., 532 U.S. 374,
121 s.ct. 1578, 149 L.Ed.2d 590 (2001). Federal issues c::m be raised and addressed
in state court. Young v. qagen, 337 U.S. 235, 69 s.ct. 1073, 93 L.~d. 1333 (1949).
So long as th,? procedural re::i:uisites for federal review are met, and subject to
i:nportant exceptions to (.See 1 Clark) prisoner's have been permitt,:::d to rai3e any
constituti:::mal claims they may have. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,474-430,

96

s.ct. 3037, 49 L.~d.2d 1067 (1976)(surveying the decision i:1 point).
The

1nited

States

Supreme

Court

has

lectu;::-,:::d

the

states

on

their

"::nerry-go-round" post-conviction pcocedures. Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561,570, 58
s.ct. 240, 92 L.Ed. 170 (1974)(Rutledge J,.

concurring).

The United States Supreme Court's power to review state judgments directly,
usually by writ of certiorari,
question,

was settled early

and

(Seei Cohens v. State of Virginia, 19 U.S.

is

264,

no

longer

5 L.Ed.

open

to

257, 1821 WL

2186 (1821), and so the habeas jurisdiction developed is nothing short of federal
trial court superintendence of state trial and appellate court adjudication of
federal claims. To the adversly convicted,

it promises to make meaningful

the

constitutional safeguards to which a criminal defendant is entitled, by way of the
federal courts using it ti implement Supreme Court decisions applying the Bill of
Rights

to

the

States

through

the

Fourteenth

Amendment.

It

is

the

specific

instrument to obtain release from unlawful confinement, seeking invalidation,
whole or

in

part,

of

the

judgment

authorizing

the

prisoner's

in

confinement.

Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 u.s. 74, 125 s.ct. 1242, 161 L.Ed.2d 253 (2005).
The Supreme Court has required a petitioner "to support his allegations of
constitutional
scientific

error

evidence,

with

new

trustworthy

reliable

evidence-whether

eyewitness

accounts,

or

it

be

exculpatory

critical

physical

evidence--that was not presented at trial." Schulp v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298. at 324
(1995). State Post-Conviction Remedies were intended to provide petitioner's with an
opportunity to litigate all questions of fact or law surrounding their federal
claims. Habeas relief serves as an incentive -in addition to direct review- for
state and federal courts to faithfully apply federal law. U.S. v. Martinez, 139
F.3d 412 (4thCir.1998).
Federal Court's may intervene to correct wrongs of constitutional dimension.
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 102 S.Ct. 940,948, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982); Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 s.ct. 2781 (1979)(holding that federal habeas courts
are open to determine the evidence adduced at trial in state court was sufficient
7

for a determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.). See Alsor Vachon v. New
Hampshire, 414

u.s

478, 94 s.ct. 664, 38 L.Ed.2d 666 (1974); Thompson v. City of

Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 80 s.ct. 624, 4 L.Ed.2d 654, 80 A.L.R.2d 1355 (1960).
And

u.s.

v.

Peltier,

422

u.s.

531,554,

95

(1975)(Brennan,J. dissenting). Henderson v.

s.ct.

Kibbe,

2313,

431 U.S.

45

L.Ed.2d

145,154,

374

97 s.ct.

1730, 52 L.Ed.2d 203 (1977)(stating that even ordinary jury instructions can be
made the basis of a constitutional claim if they relieve the prosecution of the
burden of proving each element of the offense charged.) Cupp v. naughten, 414 U.S.
141,147, 94 s.ct. 396, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973)(same).
More importantly the Appellate argues that "The inferential waiver theory
-denying the prisoner's claims when they were not, but might have been, raised at
trial or on direct review,

-reading the prisoner's procedural default

as

an

implicit waiver of the opportunity to litigate a claim, or, indeed, the underlying
right itself, Is now overruled in cases involving the right to counsel where
courts

require

that

the

alleged

waiver

be

a

voluntary

and

intelligent

relinquishment of the right. And/or are brought pursuant to ineffective assistance
of counsel. Seer Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 s.ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461,
146 A.L.R. 357 (1938).
Appellant asserted violations of his federal constitutional rights pursuant to
the United States Constitution, u.s.c.A.Const.Amend'sr §§ I; II; V; VI; VIII; IX;
and u.s.c.A.Const.Amend. XIV § I. In that his right to speedy trial was waived
without consent or reason; right to present evidence to the jury was denied and
prejudiced; Right to have the jury decide the truth and sverity of the crimes
charges was violated; And, Right o be free of unreasonable search and seizure was
violated. These constitutional violations were compounded through the ineffectiveInadequate Assistance of Trial counsel's and Appellate counsel. These claims were
fairly and properly presented to the district court in petitioner's Affidavit's;
Memornadum' s; Exhibit' s and Motion•· s on the record. The district court abused it's
discretion in failing to read the claims,

answer the claims,

and address the

claims pursuant to both state and federal law. Petitioner-Appellant was denied
equal protection of the law, denied due processes, and denied proper and lawful
review and opinion on each

of

his claims

in accordance with

constituional

standards. Those claims and supporting federal and state law that apply to them
are in the following Issues/Claims below for review. All and each of these issues
were presented in full to the district court.

(See Memorandum In Support of

Petition For Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit #F, RC-72 thru 158).
8

ISSUE ONE

WAS APPELLANT DENIED EFFECTIVE/ADEQUATE ASSISTANCE OF PRE-TRAIL, TRAIL,
AND
APPELLATE
COUNSEL,
VIOLATING
HIS
RIGHTS
PURSUANT
TOr
u.s.c.A.CONST.AMEND'S §§ I; VI; and XIV § II AND THE IDAHO STATE
CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, §§ 9; 10; 13; and §18?
The Appellant asserts yes!
(Appellant respectfully refers the Court to his Affidavit In Support of
Petition for the facts that support his claims, RC- page 20 thru 66) ( and those
pages refered to specifically in this arguement for each counsel).(Affidavit does
refer to each Exhibit specifically).
A.

CAUSE OF ACTION

Appellant claimed that his pre-trial counsel, Tim Williams of Twin Falls,
Idaho, engaged in unethical conduct,

in concert with the state and court to

capriciously waive His 6th Amendment right to speedy trial without his express
consent;

failed

to prepare

for

trial;

failed

to

investigate key witnesses;

preserve evidence; properly challenge the state in suppression hearing; failed to
obtain

exculpatory

evidence;

failed

to

object

to

prejudicial

joinder

and

allegations of probation allegations; misrepresented facts in collusion with his
firm to the court; Williams also withheld material evidence from Appellant and the
courti (the deposition of Robert Berry taken at his office, recorded).(RC-20-66)
Appellant claimed that his pre-trial counsel, Loren Bingham, of Twin Falls,
Idaho, failed to prepare for trial, investigate the case, interview witnesses, and
refused to go to trial, insisting Appellant plead guilty; failed to protect His
rights; obtain a bond hearing; file motions; or get hearings on Appellant's pro-se
motions and objections; obtain exculpatory evidence; and only filed one motion in
the whole case, after he was fired, never heard (dismissal)? Prejudicing the trial
Appellant's defense, and substantive rights. (RC-57-66)
Appellant claimed that His Trial Counsel, Dan Brown of Twin Falls,

Idaho,

failed to investigate the case; interview witnesses prior to trial; confusing and
prejudicing the witnesses,

jury,

and

the proceedings as a

whole;

failed

to

initiate proper action or object to the prosecutions intimidation of key witness,
Rober Berry; failed to object to prosecutorial misconduct at trial regarding
inadmissable evidence; false allegations; and failed to object to the use of
previous conviction for possession, as argument for intent to deliver; failed to
object to evidence at the Motel,
protect His

rights

regarding

which He was never charged with;

pro-se motions

and

objections;

failed to

allowed

double

jeopardy at sentencing; failed to obtain exculpatory evidence: prejudicing the
trial, and defense; failed to argue dismissal for 6th Amendment violations(RC-35-69)
9

Appellant claimed that Appellate counsel, Justine Curtis,

of Boise,

Idaho:

failed to investigate the record and the case file; failed to raise 4th; 5th; 6th;
8th; and 14th §I Amendment claims on appeal; failed to adequately correct his own
assertion in the appeal brief that Appellant had been convicted of Intent To
Deliver, twice,

(Appellant was only convicted of possession,

ever),

failed to

preserve these issues for review; failed to address double jeopardy at sentencing;
prosecutorial misconduct; judicial misconduct; or any pertinent trail errors at
all; inadequately argued the presentation of 404(b) evidence;

failed to allow

Appellant to supplement the argument on appeal with the Supplemental Brief (Exhbit
#68, RC-460 thru 601) ; at tempted to force Appellant to proceed pro se when this
ineffectiveness of the appeal representation was raised with him; failed to file a
response brief; refused to communicate with

Appellant;

failed

to obtain

the

complete record on appeal; failed to object to and correct the deletions and
denial of transcripts and exhibit 's on appeal;
substantive rights to a

meaningful

appeal,

failed to protect Appellant's

Prejudicing Appellant's appellate

processes and procedural rights. (Seer All Exhibit •·s and RC-5 7 thru 66, at 63-66) •
STANDARD OF REVIEW

B.

Appellant points out that a claime of ineffective assistance of counsel may
properly be brought under the post-conviction procedures act. Murray v State, 121
Idaho 918-25, 828 P. 2d 1323, 1329-30 ( Ct.App.1992). To prevail on an ineffective
assitance

of

counsel

claim,

the

defendant

must

show

that

the

attorney's

performance was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced by the deficiency.
Stricklan v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687-88, 104 s.ct. 2052,2064-65, 80 L.Ed.2d
674,693-94

(1984);

Hassett

v.

State,

127

Idaho

313,316,

900

P.2d

221,224

(Ct.App.1995). To establishe a deficiency, the appellant has the burden of showing
that

the

attorney's

representation

fell

below

an

objective

standard

of

reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,760, 760 P.2d 1174,1176 (1988). To
establsih prejudice, the appellant must show a reasonable probability that, but
for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been
different. Id. at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177.
These same standards also apply
appellate

counsel.

Mintun

(Ct.App.2007). Counsel's

v.

State,

combined

to

claims of
144

failures

Idaho

ineffective assistance of
656,667,

noted above,

and

168

P.3d

affirmed

40,45
in

the

Affidavit In Support, attached, cannot be tactical or strategic decisions. These
actions, omissions, and failures are based on "inadequate preparations, ignorance
of relevant law, and other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation, and falls
below an objective standard of reasonableness, setting forth sufficient evidence
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to raise genuine issues of material fact. Howard v. State, 126 idaho 231,233, 880
P.2d 261,263 (Ct.App.1994).

Appellant has sufficiently averred facts that,

if

proven true, and the record reflects they are, would satisfy both the deficiency
and the prejudice prongs of the Strickland test. Appellant points further that his·
claims trigger applications of the Supreme Court's companion opinion to
Strickland, u.s. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 s.ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984).
And He has submitted evidence showing that His situation is one in which prejudice
must be presumed under Cronic.

Strickland established the standard for a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel,

setting

forth

components

necessary

to

a

criminal defendant's claimsz
"First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance \..as d?ficiEnt
This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was
not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trail, a trial whose result is
reliable." Id. at 687, 104 s.ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693.
Strickland sets an

'objective standard of reasonableness'

for judging whether

errors in an attorney's performance are serious enough to render that performance
defective.

466 U.S.

Strickland,

" [ t]he

at

688,

proper

104 S.Ct.

measure

of

at

2064,

attorney

80 L.Ed.2d
performance

at

693.

remains

under
simply

reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." 466 U.S. at 688, 104 s.ct. at
2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693.
On the same day the Supreme Court handed down Strickland, it also issued a
second opinion,

Cronic,

offering an exception

to Strickland's second prong,

prejudice. Certain circumstances, said the Court, "are so likely to prejudice the
accused that

the

cost of

litigating

their

effect

in a

particular

case

is

unjustified." Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658, 104 s.ct. at 2046, 80 L.Ed.2d at 668. The
Court listed three such circumstances; l) where there is a "complete denial" of
counsel at a critical stage of trial; 2) where "counsel entirely fails to subject
the prosecutions case to meaningful adversarial testing"; and 3) where, "although
counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any
lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small
that a *806 presumption of prejudice is appropriate .•. " Id. at 659, 104 s.ct. at
2047, 80 L.Ed.2d at 668.
The Supreme Court revisited Cronic in Bell v. Cone, 535 u.s. 685, 122 s.ct.
1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002), stating? "When we spoke in Cronic of the possibility
of presuming prejudice based on an attorney's failure to test the prosecutor's
case." the Court explained,

"we indicated that the attorney's failure must be
11

complete." Bell, 535 U.S. at 696-97, 122 S.Ct. at 1851, 152 L.Ed.2d at 928.
Appellant argues that due to

the multiple

ineffectiveness in Appellant's case;
counsel;

the

layers of counsel,

intervening

periods

failure of the trial court to hear any of his

and

their

between without

pro se motions

or

objections; the hindering of the state to interfere and intimidate witnesses,
destroy evidence, withhold exculpatory evidence, and insert false allegations and
statements to the court and juryz

It is necessary to evaluate the effect of

denying Appellant's access to the courts with the prejudice inferred in both
Strickland and Cronic, and Bell.
Appellant points out that persons awaiting trial have a Sixth Amendment right
to the assistance of counsel and to an unimpeded criminal defense, a right that is
different from the more general right of access to courts and not subject to its
limitations. Benjamin v. Fraser, 264 F.3d 175,184-88 (2dCir.2001); more important
ist Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,484, 1115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995). Denying access to

court and it's processes to prepare a defense is the same as suppression of the
evidence sought or an order that prohibits the exculpatory evidence that might
have been obtained.
The right of access to the courts is

a

very important

right,

since

it

theoretically protects all your other rights. The right to file a court action
might be said to be the remaining most "fundamental political right, because its
preservative of all rights.'" McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140,153, 112 s.ct.
1081 (1992)(guoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,370 (1886)).
Furthermore, the courts are supposed to give prose filings by prisoners some
leeway, since prisoners are usually not trained in the formalities

of legal

practice. haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). Also, the rejection of appointed
counsel does not foreclose a pre-trial detainee-defendant from any and every
constitutional right of access to the courts, such as legal recourse to prepare
and present a defensem, have subpoena served, or review the state's discovery
responses in his cell. This constitutional right to prepare some type of defense
must be strictly balanced against the legitimate security needs and resources
constraints

of

the

prison

or

jail.

U.S.

v.

Robinson,

(9thCir.1990)(Seez "stand by counsel" Id. at 716. (seei
4-108, and I.e.§ 31-825 and I.e.§ 33-2612 et seg. See
I;

&

also
alsoz

913

F.2d

r.c.§§

712,717

4 _101

to

u.s.c.A.Const.Amend.

XIV; Bowmand v. Niagara Mach. and Tool Works, Inc. 832 F.2d 1052; Crowder v.

Sinyard, 884 F.2d 804; and Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 s.ct. 1087 (1985).
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ISSUE n«>

WAS APPELLANT DENIED ADEQUATE/EFFECTIVE ASSITANCE OF COUNSEL AT ALL TIMES
RELEVANT TO HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY AND PUBLIC TRIAL; WAS IT FUNDAMENTAL
PLAIN ERROR FOR THE COURT TO WAIVE PETITIONER" S RIGHTS ABSENT EXPRESS
CONSENT r PURSUANT TO: U.S. C. A. CONST. AMEND. VI ; XIV § I; AND THE IDAHO
STATE CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, §§ 13; §18; and §9?
The Appellant asserts yes!
A.

CAUSE OF ACTION

Appellant claims that the court committed fundamental error when it waived
Appellant's right to a speedy trial,

"in camera

(chamber's)

without

express

consent from Him. And that it was judicial misconduct to do so, and that doing it
without proper notice of any kind

to Appellant

violated Appellant's rights.

Appellant also claims that the court erred in taking judicial notice of other
causes and probation allegations to justify the waiver. And violated His rights by
not continuing with the trial once Appellant reported for Trial the day before, on
time, and ready. And that the court's actions inn postponing trial, without cause,
notice, without consent or

justification violated

and prejudiced Appellant's

rights and due processes, and defense. (Seer Affidavit In Support of Petition For
post-Conviction Relief, Exhibit #A,

RC-18 thru 71) (Sections Two

&

Three) (Also

Exhibits# l thru 94)(Attached).
Appellant

claims

that

his

rights

were

violated

through

prosecutorial

misconduct in the states instrumental actions to get His speedy trial rights
waived,

the

trial

postponed,

(violating

the

six

month

deadline

twice),

'introducing allegations of probation violation in a separate previous crime, know
to them well previous of the trial and using it as an excuse for revoking bond and
postponing trial. And that the state did so, to intimidate defense witnesses,
(which had been attempted days prior to the trial settings without success). The
state also refused

tpo provide the exculpatory evidence

(in

camera hearing

transcript) for use at a dismissal hearing to prevent proof of misconduct and
error.
The Appellant claims that he received ineffective/Inadequate Assitance of
counsel through their participation in delaying the trial (twice), inappropriately
failing to protect Appellant's right to speedy trial and processes. And that
counsel allowed the state to intimidate His witnesses just prior to the first
trial setting, and again at the second trial setting, and during the trial. Counsel
failed to protect the witnesses, interview them and present them time 1. Counsel
failed to object ot the waiving of Appellant's rights, and took part in it.
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Counsel allowed

the state

to

transfer

a

key witness

out of

state

and

intimidate another, all of which prejudiced the Appellant and violated his rights
enumerated above.
Appellant claims that Appellate counsel failed to raise and argue these issues
on appeal,

(also see other issues),

refused to investigate

the

case or

the

allegations and record pertaining to speedy trial issues. Appeal counsel failed to
represent

Appellant's

best

interests

on

appeal,

preserve

and

protect

His

constitutional rights rights to a meaningful appeal. (Seer Affidavit In Support of
Petition, Exhibit #A; RC-18 thru 7l)(and those Exhibit•·s enumerated within).
Appellant claims prejudice to His defense, His Appeal, and entire proceedings
due to the actions of those mentioned above.
challenged by the Petitioner in fact and law,

These actions are

in dispute,

as violations of those rights

stated. Appellant also claims that these actions are a breach of ethics,

and

professional conduct, contrary to judicial integrity and trust. Appellant makes a
federal claim in this issue.
B.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

There are four factors to consider in evaluating a claim of speedy trial
violations r (1) Constitutional Protections; ( 2)

Statutory Protections;

( 3) The

Facts of the case; and ultimately (4) The Prejudice Caused.
the Constitutional Rights issue from the United States Constitutional Sixth
Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment; The Idaho State Constitution, Article

§§ 13

and 18. Rights Statutorial issue through Idaho Code §§ 19-106 and 19-3501. And
u.s.c.A. Title 28 §§ 2241 to 2254-55.
Idaho's controlling law on the issue of speedy trial rights
19-3501

come

from

State

v.

Sindak,

116

Idaho

185,

under

774

P.2d

LC.§
895

(1989),cert.denied.sub nom; Sindak v. Idaho, 493 U.S. 1076, 107 L.Ed.2d 1032, 110
s.ct. 1125 (1990). In light of the interpretation placed upon I.c.§ 19-3501 by the
Idaho Supreme Court in Sindak, the determination of "good cause" under statute
must be made by reference to Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 33 L.Ed.2d 101, 92
S.Ct. 2182 (1972). The Court statedr "Adhering to precedent we must continue to
uniformly apply the balancing test from Barker, supra, to evaluate "good cause"
sufficient to excuse a violation of speedy trial rights under I.c.§ 3501 as well
as under the Federal Constitution." State v. Aberastur i, 117 Idaho 201,203, 786
P.2d 592,594

(Ct.App.1990);

State v.

Johnson,

119

Idaho

56,

803

P.2d

557

(Ct.App.1990).
C.

WAVIER AND ASSERTION OF RIGHT

Appellant's right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right protected by the
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United States and Idaho Constitution, and by r.c. § 19-3501. Klopfer v. State of
North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 s.ct. 988, 18 L.ED.2d l (1967); State v. Lindsay,
96 Idaho 474,475, 531 P.2d 236,237 (1975). Wavier of a Fundamental Constitutional
right must be explicit, and come from the Defendant personally. An "established"
abridgment of a constitutional right is deemed a manifest injustice as a matter of
law. State v. Simons, 112 Idaho 254, 731 P.2d 797; State v. Martinez, 89 Idaho
129, 403 P. 2d 597; The rule of law is that rights are not subject to waiver
without having been expressly waived 'In person.' Meng v. N.Y., 423 U.S. 61, 96
s.ct. 241, 46 L.Ed.2d 195 (S.Ct.1975). Under the Sixth Amendment a defendant may
only waive the right by expressing it "in writing." Seez Fed.Crim.R. 23(A). He may
only waive the right orally, if done knowingly and intelligently "on the record"
"In open court." Seez Brown v. Burns, 966 F.2d 219 (9th Cir.1993).
Appellant's records indicate that it cannot be disputed that He asserted His
Rights,

demanded a speedy trial and was present to attend.

(Seez

Affidavit,

Exhibit #A, Section two; RC-35 thru 41). Satisfying Barker, supra. Seez State v.
Rodriquez-Perez, 129 Idaho 29,38, 921 P.2d 206,215

(Ct.App.1996).

Furthermore,

waiver of right to speedy trial for purposes of review is to be judged just as it
is for other fundamental constitutional rights; prosecution must show that the
claimed waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made. Harig v. Wolff (1976,DC Neb)
414 F.Supp. 290.
D.

com'ROLLING AUTHORITY

All criminal defendants are guaranteed the right to a speedy and public trial
pursuant to the 6th Amendment and Article I §13; §18;

&

§9, of the Constitutions.

In Idaho, these constitutional provisions have been supplemented by legislation
that sets specific time limits within which a defendant must be brought to trial.
I.e.§ 19-106; § 19-3501 (2000); Schrom v. Cramer, 76 Idaho 1, 275 P.2d 979 (1954).
The original statute was enacted in 1864 while Idaho was still a territory and was
in force and effect at the time of the adoption of our constitution. Id. at 5, 275
P.2d at 981. Idaho Code§ 19-3501 statesz
"The court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown must order the
prosecution or indictment to be dismissed, in the following casesz (1)
When a person has been held to answer for a public offesne, if an
indictment or information is not found against him and filed with the
court within six (6) months from the date of his arrest. (2) If a
defendant, whose trial has not been postponed upon his application, is
not brought to trial within six (6) months from the date that the
information is filed with the court. (3) If a defendant, whose trial
has not been postponed upon his application, is not brought to trial
within six ( 6) months from the date that the defendant was arraigned
before the court in which the indictment is found.
15

Section ( 5) i " •• charged with both a felony or multiple felonies and
misdemeanor or multiple misdemeanor together in the same action or
charing document, ... from the date that the information is filed with
the court."
Section ( 6) i " ••• from the date that the defendant was arraigned before
the court in which the indictment is found."'
Appellant argues that unlike

the

statutory

speedy

trial

guarantee,

which

measures timeliness from the date of filing the information or indictment,

the

constitutional guarantees apply from the date when either formal charges are filed
or the defendant is arrested, whichever comes first. State v. hernandez, 133 Idaho
576, 990 P.2d 742 (Ct.App.1999). Subdivision 2 of I.e.§ 19-3501 is self-executing;
it is not necessary for a defendant

to affirmatively request a

trial setting

within the six months' period. State v. Dillard, 110 Idaho 834,

718 P.2d 1272

(Ct.App.), cert.denied, 479 U.S. 887, 107 s.ct. 283, 93 L.Ed.2d 258 (1986).
Under I.e.§

19-3501,

criminal defendants are given additional;

protection

beyond what is required by the constitutions. State v. Brooks, 109 Idaho 726,728,
710 P.2d 636,638 (Ct.App.1985). The statute mandates that unless the state can
demonstrate "good cause" for a delay greater than six months,

the court must

dismiss the case.
the

Idaho

Supreme

Court

has

statedi

"Upon

careful

consideration

of

the

relevant authorites, we believe that a thorough analysis of the reasons for the
delay represents the soundest method for determining what constitutes good cause,"
"We therefore conclude that goog cause means that there is a substantial reason
that rises to the level of a legal excuse for the delay." State v. Johnson, 119
Idaho 56,58,

803 P.2d 557,559

(Ct.App.1990);

494,496, 745 P.2d 1115,1117 (Ct.App.1987)."

State

v.

Stuart,

113

Idaho

at

And that a trial judge does not have

unbridled discretion to find good cause, and on appeal they will independently
review the lower court's decision. Johnson,

119 idaho at 58,

803 P.2d at 559;

Stuart, 113 Idaho at 496, 745 P.2d at 1117; Naccarato, 126 Idaho at 13, 878 P.2d
at 187. The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that, "When examining the reasons for
the delay, this Court has consistently maintained that overcrowded courts are to
be a 'neutral factor' which "'nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate
responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than
with the defendant."' Cotant, 123 Idaho at 786 n. 3, 852 P.2d at 1386 n.3 (quoting
Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 s.ct. at 2192); Russell, 108 Idaho at 61, 696 P.2d at
911."

E.

PREJUDICE CAUSE/PREJUDICE PRESUMED
The nature and extent of the prejudice is the most important of the Barker
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factors. State v. McNew, 131 Idaho 268,273, 954 P.2d 686,691 (Ct.App.1998). When
considering prejudice

the Court

looks at

prevention

of

oppressive

pretrial

incarceration, minimization of the accused's anxiety and concern, and limiting the
possibility of the defense being imparied. Barker, 407 U.S.

514,532,

92 S.Ct.

2182, 2193. As state above, speedy trial guarantees are designed to minimize the
possibility of lengthy incarceration before trial, to reduce the lesser impairment
of liberty on an accused when released on bail, and to shorten the disruption of
life caused by an arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges, and most
importantly, possible prejudice to the defense presented by the defendant. U.S. v.
Loud hawk, 474 u.s. 302,311, 106 s.ct. 648,654 (1985).
See Alsoi Morre v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25,27, 94 s.ct.

188,

38 L.Ed.2d 183

(1973); Strunk v. u.s., 412 u.s. 434,439, 93 s.ct. 2260, 37 L.Ed.2d 56 (1973);
Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374,378, 89 s.ct. 575, 21 L.Ed.2d 607 (1969); Arrant v.
Wainwright, supra, 468 F.2d ay 682; Chapman v. California, 423 F.2d 682,683 (9th
Cir.),cert.denied, 400 U.S. 960, 91 s.ct. 360, 27 L.Ed.2d 269 (1970); U.S. ex rel.
Burage v. Pate, 316 F.2d 582,584 (7th Cir.1963); U.S. v. Huffman, 490 F.2d 412,413
(8th Cir.1973),cert.denied, 416 U.S. 988, 94 s.ct. 2395, 40 L.Ed.2d 766 (1974).
The Appellant has shown that he was in fact prejudiced (Seer Affidaivt), he
lost witnesses, evidence was destroyed that could have supported his innocence
claim, and once his speedy trial was waived by the court, he was denied bail,
inflicting on him an oppressive, and over excessive incarceration to attempt to
force him to plead guilty.
The Appellant preserved all his issues, objecting on the record to each waiver
of any right, and changing counsel when they showed prejudice and conflict. There
is ample record to indicate that the Appellant did not consent to any waiver, was
not present when it was done, and was in custody prior to trial, eliminating the
need for any postponement.
The Appellant was denied access to witnesses, evidence, exculpatory evidence,
and processes due to the delay. Furthermore, the Appellant was held without bond,
and denied access to the court, denied the right to file motions and objections,
and those he did try to file were disregarded by the court, saying,

"The court

does not entertain pro se motions," the state presented the same argument, they
would not give the Appellant access to the court,

and denied Him through an

intentional delay in the processes that was unnecessary and in violation of His
rights. (Seer Exhibit #A).
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ISSUE THREE

WAS APPELLANT DENIED EFFECTIVE/ADEQUATE ASSISTANCE OF
CONCERNING HIS RIGHT TO BE FREE OF ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE
FOURTH AMENDMENT DUE TO COUNSEL'S FAILURES TO PROPERLY RAISE
PRE-TRIAL; AND AGAIN DENIED ASSISTANCE WHEN APPELLATE COUNSEL
RAISE IT ON APPEAL? PURSUANT TO u.s.c.A.CONST.AMEND. IVI V;
AND IDAHO STATE CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I§§ 13 and I 17?

COUNSEL
UNDER THE
THE ISSUE
FAILED TO
XIV § I;

The Appellant asserts yes!
A.

CAUSE OF ACTION

The Appellant refers the Court to His Affidavit In Support of his Petition For
Post-Conviction Relief, Exhibit #A)(RC-18-71), for the complete facts surrounding
this claim, which refer in turn to the Exhibit's (Attached).(RC-23 thru 34).
Appellant claims that the court erred in not granting His Motion To Suppress
the evidence predicated on either: an illegal stop; a pretextual stop; and illegal
detention through exctesnion; and/or illegal search.
Appellant claims his right to fair due processes were violated, effecting the
entire proceedings, through prosecutorial/governmental misconduct; when the state
intentionally

submitted

witnesses and agent's;

'known'

false

Affidavits;

false

testimony

by

their

and intentionally withheld exculpatory evidence;

in a

concerted effort to overcome suppression and legitimize their case in chief.
Appellant claims that His counsels failed to properly challenge the states
evidence, refused to point out the officers false testimony, failed to argue the
illegal detention and search through the evidence available to him, and failed to
point out thati Appellant should have been allowed to leave the scene after the
ticket

was

written;

that

Appellant's

assertion

of

events

could

have

been

established through the presentation of the police stop video; (which was and has
been withheld by the state - denying exculpatory evidence); that the officers were
stalking Him, lied about it, and than admitted it on audio; and failed to properly
question defense witnesses; and failed to prepare for the hearing. All of which
denied Appellant the Effective Assistance of Counsel.
Appellant insisted that this issue be raised on direct appeal,

and appeal

counsel refused to preserve it or raise it, (Seei Exhibit #68; RC-460 thru 601).
And therefore claims ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in this issues,
as in all issues. (See: Exhibit~s #1 thru #94).
The Appellant points out that the admitted practice and policy of Officers
Nathan Silvester and Clint Doerr, to wit, "singling out and pursuing citizens on
the public road, that they want to detain and search,

without a warrant, and

follow them without probable cause, until they can either fabricate a claim or
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make a claim that the citizen has violated some traffic law, real or imagined, and
use that as an excuse to detain them, search them, and than lie about the original
intent 1"

is

a pretextual

ratiocination

to

detain

and

search

that

violated

Appellant's Rights and is an illegal practice and custom which is unconstitutional
as a whole, and held so by the United States Supreme Court and Idaho Supreme
Court.
Appellant

challenges

both

the

factual

findings,

and

the

constitutional

analysis of the suppression court. He asserts they are clearly erroneous creating
fundamental error, in particularly in light of the record.

(See1 Affidavit and

Section One (RC-23-34) supporting exhibits)(Attached). Appellant makes a Federal
Claim in this issue, as well as all issues herein.
B.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision
on a mnotion to suppress is challenged,
findings of fact

the Court accepts the trial court's

unless they are clearly erroneous,

and

freely

application of constitutional principles to the facts. State v.
Idaho 336,338,

79

P.#d 157,159

(Ct.App.2003);

State v.

reviews

the

Lafferty,

139

Atkinson,

128

Idaho

559,561, 916 P.2d 1284,1286 (Ct.App.1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to
asses the credibility of witnesses, resolve a factual conflicts, weigh evidence,
and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina,
127 Idaho 102,106, 897 P.2d 993-997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786,789,
979 P.2d 659.662 (Ct.App.1999).
C.

(emphasis on fundamental error)(federal below)

FALSIFICATION/PRETEXTUAL ANALYSIS

Appellant argues that the violation of a constitutional right by subterfuge
cannot be justified, and the circumstances of Appellant's case leaves no other
inference than that this was exactly the purpose of the traffic stop allegation,
(subterfuge). Such allegations by police are and was analogous to submitting a
false affidavit to a magistrate to get a warrant.

This also invalidates the

warrantless search. Taglavore v. U.S., 291 F.2d 262 (9th Cir.1961); henry v. U.S.,
361

u.s.

98,103, sos.ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959).

When reviewing a court •·s decision on a motion to suppress, the Court defers to
the findings of fact unless they are not supported by substantial and competent
evidence in the record. State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550,552-53, 961 P.2d 641,643-44
(1998); State v. Thurman, 134 Idaho 90,94, 996 P.2d 309,313 (Ct.App.1999). Motions
to suppress evidence for violation of constitutional rights present questions of
fact and law. The facts mete rial to the issues raised in this Appeal are in
dispute.
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Appellant points out

that mere curiosity

or

hunches

do

not

constitute

reasonable suspicion. In re Tony c., 21 Cal.3d 888, 148 Cal.Rpt. 366, 582 P.2d 957
(1978); neither does speculation suffice to establish reasonable suspicion. State
v. Dillion, 308 Minn. 464, 242 N.W.2d 84 (1976).
impermissible

factors,

such as

improper

Appellant's case deals with

intent and motive,

that

in and

of

themselves are constitutionally prohibitive under Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence.
The Fourth Amendment safeguard against unreasonable searches and

seizures

applies to the seizures of persons through arrests or detentions falling short of
arrest. U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,878, 95 s.ct. 2574,2578, 45 L.Ed.2d
607,614 n (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 u.s. 1,16, 88 s.ct. 1868,1877, 20 L.Ed.2d
889,902 (1968). The stop of a vehicle is a seizure of its occupants and is
therefore subject to Fourth Amendment standards. U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,417,
101 s.ct. 690,694,
648,653-654,

66 L.Ed.2d 621,628

99 s.ct.

1391,1395-96,

(1981);

Delaware

v.

Prouse,

440 U.S.

59 L.Ed.2d 660,667-689

(1979);

State v.

Haworth, 106 Idaho 405,406, 679 P.2d 1123,1124 (1984). When the purpose of the
detention is to investigate a possible traffic offense or other crime, it must be
based upon reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Brognoni-Ponce,
supra, at 884, at 2581, and at 618; Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. at .491,498, 103
s.ct. 1319,1324, 75 L.Ed.2d 229,236 (1983); State v. Schumacher, 136 Idaho 509, 37
P.3d 6 (Ct.App.2001).
Appellant argues that in New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990), the United
States Supreme Court stated, "The purpose of the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary
rule is to eliminate incentives for police officers to violate that Amendment."
U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 468 U.S. 906 (1984). "A police officer who violates
the Constitution usually does so to obtain evidence that he could not secure
lawfully. The best way to deter him is to provide that any evidence so obtained
will not be admitted at trial.

Deterrence of constitutional

violations

thus

requires the suppression not only of evidence seized during an unconstitutional
search but also of 'derivative evidence, both tangible and testimonial, that is
the product of the primary evidence, or that is otherwise acquired as an indirect
result of the unlawful search." Murray v. U.S., 487 U.S. 533, 487 U.S. 536-537
(1988)(citing Nardone v. U,S,, 308 U.S. 341 (1939); See also, Wong Sun v. U.S.,
371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963). Accord, Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 422

U.S.

599

(1975).
Appellant points out that by the officer's own testimony, (Seer Affidavit §I
and Exhibit #7 & 8), their intent was not good faith. they statedr "I know who you
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are Phillip, I was looking for a reason to pull you over." Therefore, the leon
exception good faith rule does not apply. The false information exception finds
its origin in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 s.ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667
(1978). State v. Schaffer, 107 Idaho 812,819,

693 P.2d 458,465

(Ct.App.1984).

Franks has been applied by the idaho Supreme Court in a case in which probable
cause for the issuance of a search warrant was at issue. State v. Lindner, 100
Idaho 37, 592 P.2d 852 (1979).
Appellant argues that where the stop is only a sham or a front being used as
an excuse for making a search, the stop itself and the ensuing search are illegal.
e.g., Worthington v. U.S., 6 Cir., 1948, 166 F.2d 557; Henderson v. u.s., 4 Cir.,
1926, 12 F.2d 528, 51 A.L.R. 420. "A stop may not be used as a pretext to search
for evidence." U.S. v. Lefkowitz, 1932, 285 U.S. 452,467, 52 s.ct. 420,424, 76
L.Ed. 877, "A stop is not justified by what the subsequent search discloses." Rios
v. u.s. 253,261-262, 80 s.ct. 1431, 4 L.Ed.2d 1688 (1960); Henry v. U.S., 361 U.S.
98,103, 80 s.ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959).
Appellant points out

that

for

Constitutional purposes and analysis,

the

actions of individual law enforcement officers is the actions of the state itself,
e.g., Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339,346-347 (1880). An Appellant can argue on
collateral proceedings that the stop of His vehicle was pretext to conduct illegal
search, where defense counsel did during suppression hearing assert that the case
involved pretext stop. See: Amendment IV; State v. Yeates, 112 Idaho 377,380, 732
P.2d 346-49 91987). For false allegations seer Henderson, supra, at 298 (1987);
nand Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 69 L.Ed.2d 340, 101 s.ct. 2587; Arizona v.
Evans, 514 U.S. l, 131 L.Ed.2d 34, 115 s.ct. 1185. Officer Silvester's "hunch" is
not sufficient to justify, ex post facto,

a seizure that was not objectively

reasonable at its inception. Id., Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 s.ct. at 1883,
20 L.Ed.2d at 909.
Because the circumstances wwere far from "sufficient to warrant a prudent
man's believing that the person

[stopped]

had committed or was committing an

offense," U.S. v. Bertram, 719 F.2d 735,737-38 (5thCir.1983), probable cause did
not exist.
As Idaho Courts recognized more than a decade ago in State v. Slater, 136
Idaho 293, 32 P.3d 685 (Ct.App.2001); and in State v. Martinez, 129 Idaho 426,430,
925

P.2d 1125,1129

(Ct.App.1996).

"Officer must

have-is

aware

of

"specific

articulable facts," together with ratiuonal inferences therefrom, which "warrant
suspicion" that the person "has committed" or is about to commit a crime." "The
policre officer's suspicion must be premised upon specific articulable facts and
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the rational inferences drawn from

those

facts.

State v.

DuValt,

131

Idaho

550,552-53, 961 P.2d 641,643-44 (1998). id. at 298, 32 P.3d at 690. Seei Prouse,
supra, at 653, at 1395, at 660 (1979); State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821,824, 54 P.3d
464,467 (Ct.App.2002).
Appellant also argues that when the police retain a citizens identification,
(as was done after the ticket was wrote in Appellant's case),

it

is

not

a

consentiual detention. U.S. v. Chemaly, 741 F.2d 1346,1353 (llthCir.1984). State
v. jones, 126 Idaho 791,793, 890 P.2d 1214,1216 (Ct.App.1995).
The Idaho Supreme Court gave essentially the same analysis as Terry v. Ohio,
supra, in State v. lusby, 146 idaho 506, 198 P.3d 735, (page 3, ANALYSIS). Where
they point out, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 s.ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961);
Stone v. powell, 428 u.s. 465,592, 96 s.ct. 3037,3051, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976);
State v. Bower, 135 Idaho 554,558, 21 P.3d 491,495 (Ct.App.2001).
The Appellant argues that while he has the burden of submitting evidence of a
'factual nexus' betwgeen the illegality and the evidence, (which he has done, see:
Affidavit and Exhibits, Attached), the state has the ultimate burden of persuasion
to show that the evidence is untainted. Which they have grossly failed to do!
State

v.

Babb,

Nava-Ramirez,

210

136

Idaho

F.3d

95,98,

1128,1131

29

P.3d

406,409

(lOthCir.2000);

(Ct.App.2001);

U.S.

v.

Kandik,

U.S.
633

v.
F.2d

1334,1335 (9th Cir.1980). Suppression is required if 'the evidence sought to be
suppressed would not have come to light but for the government's unconstitutional
conduct."

State

v.

Wigginton,

142

Idaho

180,184,

125

P.3d

536,540

(Ct.App.2005)(quoting nava-Ramirez, supra, at 1131).
In conclusion the Appellant cites a section of the Ini ted States Supreme
Courts ruling over fifty years ago in Henry v. u.s., 361 U.S. 98, 80 s.ct. 168, 4
L.Ed.2d 134,

(page 4)

z

"The statute states the constitutional standard,"

(18

U.S.C.A. § 3052), "for it is the command of the Fourth Amendment that no warrants
for either searches or arrests shall issue except 'upon probable cause, supported
by oath or Affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.'" "The requirement of probable cause has roots
that are deep in our history. The general warrant, (Declared Illegal by the house
of Commons in 1766. 16 hansard, Parl.Hist.Eng. 207), in which the name of the
person to be arrested was left blank, and the writs of assistance, against which
james otis inveighed, (Quincy's Miss.Rep. 1761-1772, Appendix, p.469) Is outlawed.
And therefore, Appellant's seizure and than search was unconstitutional at best.
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ISSUE FOUR

WAS APPELLANT DENIED EFFECTIVE/ADEQUATE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR
FAILURE TO EITHER, REMEDY, OBJECT, OR APPEAL THE PROSECUTORIAL &
JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT J. VIOLATING MY RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT; PRESENT
WITNESSES; AND DENIAL OF ACCESS TO THE COURT THROUGH DISREGARDING PRO SE
MOTIONS AND OBJECTIONSJ PURSUANT TOi U.S.C.A.CONST.AMEND. §§ V; Vi; and
§XIV, §I, AND IDAHO CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I§§ l; 13; AND§ 18?
The Appellant asserts yes!
(Appellant respectfully refers to His Affidavit In Support of Post-Conviction;
Exhbi t #A; with Exhibits #1 thru 94; and all those transcripts and Clerk's Record
mentioned
therein
as
if
fully
contained
herein.
(Seez
Exhibit
#A
§1;§2;§3;§4;§5;§6)(RC-l thru 649).
A.

CAUSE OF ACTION

Appellant claims the state condemned him to the jury for exercising His right
to remain silent, accused Him of lying; and all manner of allegations for not
testifying;

violating

His

right

to

remain

silent

and

be

free

of

self

incrimination.(Seei Affidavit)(Attached as Exhibit #A).
Appellant claims the state made false statements and claims to
asserting allegations and accusations

the

jury,

that were never admitted into evidence,

never supported or corroborated with any evidence; prejudicing the jury and His
rights.
Appellant claims that the state knew their officers were committing perjury
under oath,

and allowed them to in support of their case, and that

the state

withheld exculpatory evidence to hide this fact in the form of the video of the
stop; Dispatch Records; and complete Audio; as well as destroying evidence that
had DNA evidence on it, e.g., the syringes in the bag, container's, baggies, and
other evidence found in the bags containing the drugs.
The Appellant claims the state intimidated his witnesses, deported one key
witness prior to trial, and threatened and intimidated another key witness in the
middle of the trial, and suppressed his testimony when it exonerated the Appellant
andsupported

his

claim

of

innocence.

(Seei

Affidavit

In

Support

of

Petition)(Exhibit #1;2;3;4;5;6; and #7).
Appellant claims the trial court committed

fundamental

error and

misconduct when itz waived Appellant's right to a speedy trial;
notice of a prior probation violation; granting 404(b);

judicial

taking judicial

threatening the county

notary for notarizing Robert Berry's affidavit; than suppressing the affidavit;
Appellant

claims

judicial;

misconduct

outside the presence of the jury; allowing

by

taking

Robery

Berry's

the state to threaten

outside the courtroom; and threatenting Robert Berry himsrlf on
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testimony

the witness

the stand for

testifying for the Appellant.
Appellant claims misconduct by permitting false evidence of a conviction for
possession with intent to deliever, being a drug dealer in the community;

his

family being drug dealers; being a threat to law enforcement; being like a child
molester; and other inappropriate allegations and remarks submitted to the jury by
the court and the state.
Appellant claims

judicial misconduct by

ignoring

the

jury's

verdict

of

possession only and reaccusing Appellant of intent to deliver again at sentencing,
(Seei Issue Five-Double jeopardy).
Appellant claims the court committed judicial misconduct by admonishing Him
for asserting a defense and exercising his right to due processes.

Appellant

points out the following statement by the courti
"A jury convicted you in the newest cases of possession of a controlled
substance. I recognize that that's what they convicted you of." "That's
what the evidence they saw, they felt, supported in a case of b~yond a
reasonable doubt proof." (TT.p.1027.L-l-10); " •. I am trying to step back
from that and in this wide and largely unlimited view that I take, try
to see what has brought you before me in a lot larger scheme or scope
than they did." (TT.p.1027 .L-6-10); "I have a person who has been tried
twice for possession with intent to deliver drugs, as has been noted, a
fairly consistent theme or defense." (TT.p.1027.L-12-15). " •• ,I come
down to the conclusion, •• " (TT.p.1028.L-ll); " •• ,that I simply do not
accept your defenses in this case." (TT.p.1028.L-16); "I accept the
theory that .• , " ( L-18) , " .• , you've had •• , as a need to buy these very
expensive things, you've had to deal." (TT.p.1028.L-19-20).
The Appellant claims that this reaccusation and reconviction without the jury
is double jeopardy, a clear and gross violation of due processes, and outright
usurpation of the jury's verdict and right to a jury trial. It is also a clear
proof of prejudice and biased presence of the trial court throughout the entire
proceedings.
The

Appellant

claims

the

Court

committed

judicial

misconduct

through

submitting to the jury an instruction that the Appellant had been convicted in a
previous case of Possession with intent to Deliver? (See1 Jury instruction #35);
(Which states?

r.c. § 37-2732(a)). And again with the jury instruction to not

believe any of Robert Berry's testimony (the portions read to the jury); (See?
Jury Instruction #18).
Appellant claims that these combined errors and misconduct wer not corrected
by counsel, nor were they appealed by appellate counsel, all of which prejudiced
the Appellant's subs tan ti ve rights and violated his due processes, denying him
a meaningful appeal and fair trial, denhing Him Effective Assistance of Counsel.
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B.

STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

Appellant

argues

that

a

conviction

will

be

reversed

for

prosecutorial

misconduct if the conduct is sufficiently egregious so as to result in fundamental
error.

Id.

Prosecutorial misconduct rises to

the

level

of

fundamental

error

when it is calculated to inflame the minds of the jurors and arouses prejudice or
passion against the defendant,

or is so inflammatory that the jurors may be

influenced to determine guilt on factors outside the evidence. State v. Kuhn, 139
Idaho 710,715, 85 P.3d 1109,1114 (Ct.App.2003).
When there is no contemporaneous objection, the Three Tiered Inquiry is i 1.
Determine factually if there was misconduct. 2. Determine whether the misconduct
rose to the level of fundamental error.

3.

Consider whether such misconduct

prejudiced the defendant's right to a fair trial or whether it was harmless. State
v. Field, 144 Idaho 556,571, 165 P.3d 273,285 (2007).
The rational of this rule is that even a timely objection to such inflammatory
statements would not have cured the inherent prejudice. State v. Pecor, 132 Idaho
359,368, 972 P.2d 737,746 (Ct.App.1998). And closing argument should not include
the prosecutor's personal opinions and beliefs about the credibility of a witness
or inlfarnmatory words employed inn describing the defendant. State v. Phillips,
144 Idaho 82,86, at 87, 156 P.3d 583,587, at 588 (Ct.App.2007). it is improper to
label the defendant as a 'liar" for testimony given in his defense. Kuhn, 139
idaho at 716, 85 P.3d at 1115 (Ct.App.2003).
Appellant points out that, misconduct

will be regarded as fundamental error

when it "goes to the foundation or basis of a

defendant's

right which was

essential to his defense and which no court could or ought to permit him to
waive." State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694,716, 215 P.3d 414,436 (2009). see alsoi
State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415,423, 776 P.2d 424,432 (1989). The requirement that
the state prove the elements of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt is essential
for the protection of life and liberty. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,362 (1970).
C.

UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

Appellant argues that the prosecutions use

of words

in closing

argument

violated His Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, (seei Exhibit A), where the
state used words

such as

"undisputed,"

"unchallenged,"

"uncontradicted,"

and

"unanswered" in closing argument to the jury. As well as calling appellant a
"liar,"

and

accusing

Him of

"intimidation,"

introducing any evidence to support these

and

even other crimes,

allegations,

and

this

without

amounted

to

indirect references to the Appellant's nfailure to testify and violated the Fifth
and Sixth Amendment rights of Appellant requiring a retrial. Williams v. Lane,
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The

•

Petitioner argues

that

•

the government may not

interfere with

the

presentation of a defendant ts case, whether the interference takes the fonn of an
"unnecessary evidentiary rule" or some other means; the test is whether the evidence
would have been material and favorable to the defense; in Milla, the Court found
that the witnesses•· testimony would have been cumulative and would have altered the
juryta perception and determination of the facts; however, counsel failed to raise
the abuse of discretion issue on

appeal;

the

failure

to do

so constituted

ineffective assistance of counsel. Virgin Islands v. Mills, 956 F.2d 443,445-456
(3dCir.1992).
The source for the constitutional right to present defense evidence is the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. That clause is certainly expansive enough
to function as the source of the general constitutional right the courts have
recognized. u.s.C.A.Const.Amend. V; and Churchwell, The Constitutional Right To
Present Evidence; . Progeny of Chambers v. Mississippi, 19 Crim.L.Bull. 131,148
(1983); and Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 Mich.L.Rev. 71,109 (1974).
D.

RIGHT TO EXOJLPMXRY EVIDENCE

Petitioner made a forthright claim of actual innocence! Both in pre-trial
hearings, (Preliminary/Suppression/Dismissal), and at trial objections and questions
as to the handling and testing and preservation of the evidence were raised,
claiming prejudice and violations of Petitioner'"s Sht, 6th, and 14th Amendment
rights. Extensive testimony was taken at these hearings and at trial establishing
this. (See Affidavit In Support & Exhibit'"s).
Petitioner was entitled to not only the preservation of all evidence that
would support His claim, but also to cross examine that evidence through test '"s,
expert witnesses, and the reliability of adequate and proper evidentiary
preservation processes and handling. the record is clear that it was not preserved.
To have evidence gathered and preserved in a fashion that would allow for
further examination is a constitutional guaranteed right. Seez u.s.C.A.Const.Amend.
V; Const.Amend. VI; Const.Amend. 14 § I; and Idaho State Constitution, Article I, §
7; § 13; and; 18.
Petitioner argues that to have such evidence destroyed, altered, or
contaminated, and presumed and attributed to Petitioner violates the rights
enumerated above and below, and those rules and laws herein stated.
Plain error affecting substantial rights, even if not properly brought to the
attention of the trial court, may serve as the basis for review. State v. Johnson,
119 Idaho 852, 810 P.2d 1138 (Ct.App.1991). These are fundamental error as well.
-
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•

•

Petitioner points outr Pursuant to I.R.E. Rule 104(b)t (Ct.App.199l)r
"Whenever the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a
condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or in the courtts
discretion subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to
support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition."
Petitioner points out; Pursuant to I.R.E. Rule 303(b);
"The Court shall not direct the jury to find a presumed fact against
the accused."
I.R.E. Rule 401 statesz
"Relevant Evidence" means evidence having any tendancy to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence."
Accurate testing of the evidence, and its preservation woul? have served for
the purposes of impeaching the states claims of possession, contamination, and
ownership. State v. pressnall, 119· Idaho 207, 804 P.2d 936 (Ct.App.1991); State v.
Hocker, 115 Idaho 544, 768 P.2d 807 (1989).
Petitioner argues that in order to show that the results of scientific tests
are material and probative, the proponent of the evidence must establish the
reliability of the tests to produce accurate results. this may be done by
establishing the scientific acceptability of the testing process. General
scientific acceptance is a proper condition for taking judicial notice. State v.
Van Sickle, 120 Idaho 99, 813 P.2d 910 (Ct.App.1991).
In Petitionerts case, no fingerprints were taken of the syringes, which had
been used according to testimony; Not all the substances were tested; officerts did
not wear gloves in the search; they also contaminated the money, separating it from
the rest of the evidence, giving it to the K-9 unit, which handles subtances even
in the contaminated toy; among other things. No DNA testing was done, and the state
destroyed that evidence altogether.
Petitioner argues that it is a due process right to have access to potentially
exculpatory evidence, since it holds evidence relating to questions of guilt or
excuse. Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 718 P.2d 283 (1986). In U.S. v. Scheffer
the United States Supreme court considered the argument that the Sixth Amendment
requires courts to allow a defendant to present allegedly exculpatory evidence. The
states handling and destruction of the evidence violated Petitioner 1·s 6th Amendment
right to exercise compulsory process to present a complete defense.
Petitioner points out that He claimed he was innocent. Actual innocence menas
"factual innocence, not mere legal sufficiency." Bousley v. u.s., 523 U.S. 614, at
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-

•

•

623 (1998).

"Clear and convincing evidence is generally understood

to be

" [ e] vidence

indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. •· 11
In re Adoption of Doe, 143 Idaho 188,191, 141 P.3d 1057,1060 (2006)(quoting Black~s
law Dictionary 577 (7th Ed.1999).
Petitioner argues that the right to present defense evidence is a "fundamental
element of due process of law." Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 108 s.ct. 646, 98
L.Ed.2d 798 (1988). And points out that ·relying on the due process guarantee
simplifies the constitutional analysis. See1

Clinton,

The right

Defenset An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in Criminal Trials,

to Present

a

9 Ind.L.Rev.

711,756,763,774,782,793,803,858 (1976).
Petitioner argeus that on several occasions the Supreme Court has looked to
the confrontation clause as the source of an accused ..s

constitutional right to

present helpful evidence to the trier of fact. Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 88
s.ct. 748, 19 L.Ed.2d 956 (1968). The core purpose of the Sixth Amendment is that
the defendant has the same rights

to

introduce evidence as

the prosecution.

Pettijohn v. Hall, 599 F.2d 476,481 (lst.Cir.1979}(Westen, The Compulsory Process
Clause, 73 Mich.L.Rev. 71,96 (1974): Alsor Amar, Foreword: Sixth Amendment First
Principles, 84 Geo.L.J. 641,697-705 (1996).
Petitioner argues that the Eighth Amendment

requires that a defendant be

allowed to present all relevant evidence in mitigation. The Federal Constitution
"requires States to allow consideration of mitigation evidence in all cases. Any
barrier to such consideration must therefore fall." McKay v. North Carolina, 494

u.s.

433,442,

110 s.ct.

1227,1233;

108

L.Ed.2d

369,380

(1990).

It

is

the

government~s burden to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for each and every
element

of

offense.

McDaniel

v.

Brown,

129

s.ct.

1038,

173

L.Ed.2d

468

(2009)(instr.).
Petitioner argues that it was constitutional fundamental error to violate
statutory and constitutional protections designed specifically to preserve and
protect evidence that may benefit an actual innocence claim.

It was a prejudicial

presumption on the part of the government to naturally presume relationship of
evidence, and forgo testing and processing and testing that was enacted to protect
and preserve both the evidence and the rights of the accused.
The Idaho Supreme Court has set aside a jury .. s finding of guilt where the
state failed to present substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
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•

•

State v. Horejs, 143 Idaho 260,263, 141 P.3d 1129,1132

(Ct.App.2006): State v.

Medina, 128 Idaho 19,27, 909 P.2d 637,645 (Ct.App.1996).
Petitioner has claimed that the policy of throwing away exculpatory evidence
without testing for prints or DNA (syringes), prejudiced His right as to present
exculptaor evidence, through the mishandling and destruction of it, to obtain tests
that could of proven he was innocent. Also, handling the money by Doerr, and not
using gloves when searching, as well as rubbing the K-9 toy on the vehicle, all
work together to demonstrate prejudice. A demonstration of "prejudice" flowing from
the denial of a Constitutional safeguard may be either an essential element of the
claim itself or, perhaps, an additional evidentiary requirement in the particular
case before relief is awarded. Wabasha v. Solem, 694 F.2d 155,159 (8thCir.1982};
Batten v. Scurr, 649 F.2d 564 (SthCir.1981).
At least two kinds of "prejudice" are identified in the cases. First, there is
the "prejudice" by which a court means that there is reason to believe that the
error might have affected the judgment.

It is that sort of "prejudice" which

mandates a reversal under state law when the error is identified on direct review
in

state

court.

Second,

there

is

the

"prejudice'.'

which

renders

a

trial

fundamentally unfair, entitling the prisoner to relief as a federal matter - on
direct review if the issue is presented there, or in collateral proceedings in
federal court if the issue evades detet111ination until that stage.
Jarvis,

648 F.2d 981

(Sthcir.1981);

Bryson

v.

state of Ala.,

634

Hopkins v.
F.2d

862

(SthCir.1981); Nelson v. Estelle, 642 F.2d 903 (SthCir.1981).
The United states Supreme Court has held that on collateral review by a
federal court of criminal judgment of a state court, the federal court assesses
prejudicial impact of the state court,.s constitutional error under 'Brecht,_s .. more
forgiving "substnatial and injurious effect" standard, and not under i-chapman,.s'"
"harmless beyond reasonable doubt" standard. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 127
s.ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96, 68 Fed.R.Serv.3d 190 (2007).
Petitioner points out that a Confrontation Clause violation is subject to
hat111less error analysis of federal review. Relief is proper if any state-court
error had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the juryts
verdict. A Petitioner is entitled to relief if he can show that any constitutional
violation

resulted

in

actual

prejudice.

Hernandez

v.

Small,

282

F.3d

1132

(9thCir.2002).
An arbitrary application of even valid state law, (policy), may constitute a
denial of equal protection or due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth
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•

•

Amendment. Whether a violation of state law abridges the Federal Constitution is a
"separate inquiry in which the key factors are fundamental fairness and prejudice
from the loss of rights afforded to similarly situated defendants." powers v.
White, 680 F.2d 51,52 (8thCir.1982).
Petitioner argues that an issue of fact arisesz 1. upon a plea of not guilty.
Seez I.C. § 19-1901. Issues of fact must be tried by jury-unless waived. Seez I.e.
§ 19-1902. A trial for felony must be by jury of twelve and result in unanimous

verdict. State v. Scheminisky, 31 Idaho 504, 174 p. 611 (1918). The authority of
the jury as to questions of fact is absolute as the authority of the court with
respect to questions of law. State v. Golden, 67 Idaho 497, 186 P.2d 485 (1947}.
Petitioner argues that much of the evidence in this case was gathered and
presented as a presumption. The evidence was confiscated with little regard for any
possibility of fingerprints. Contaminated without regard for cross contamination,
and destroyed without any thought for its exculpatory worth to the Peti_tioner. it
was presented to the jury as a presumption of guilt, removing the burden of proof
for the government. Presumptions under the rules of evidence relieves the party in
whose favor the presumption operates from having to adduce further evidence of the
presumed fact until the opponent introduces substantial evidence of the
nonexistence of the fact. I.R.E. Rule 301: Krebs v. Krebs, 114 Idaho 571, 759 p.2d
77 (Ct.App.1988); Bongiovi v. Jamisan, 110 Idaho 734, 718 p.2d 1172 (1986).
The Court •·s have frequently resorted to the Fifth Amendment guarantee to
vindicate the right to present a defense. The Supreme Court has expressly relied on
the due process guarantee in several cases invalidating restrictions on an
accused 1·s ability to present exculpatory evidence. And the Court held that the
application of the state hearsay rule to bar defense evidence was unconstitutional.
The court held that the trial judge~s ruling had denied the defendant fundamental
fairness and a fair trial. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, at 290-303, 93
s.ct. 1038, at 1043-1049, 35 L.Ed.2d 297, at 305-313 (1973).
F.

RIGB'l' ID NEWLY DISCDVERED EVIDENCE

Petitioner has provided evidence in His Affidavit that evidence that the idaho
State Laboratory, staff and Expert witnesses, were, had been, and for a long period
of time wer engaged in illegal practices that possibly altered, contaiminated,
changed, and/or substituted elements of evidence sent to them for testing and other
considerations. these actions •·all'" were in violation of law, ~licy, and
constitutional standards for the preservation of evidence and the reliability of
the testimony and testing regarding it. Raising reasonable doubt regarding.. the
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evidence tested by The Idaho State Laboratory personnel, and more importantly,
withholding this infonnation from the defendant, denying Him the right to confront
the evi<?ence, the expert witnesses from the Lab, and question the reliability of
the

states

allegations

regarding

the

substances

presented

to

the

jury.

In

particularly in light of the fact that not all the substances were tested properly,
preserved properly, and handled properly.
There is no doubt that the state in this case withheld and suppressed (whether
inadvertantly or not)

information that was

favorable

to

the defense,

thereby

creating a Brady/Giglio scenario. In this regard, consideration of the law set-out
in U.S. v. Kohring, 637 F.3d 895 (9thCir.2011) is particularly relevant to the
circumstances in the principle case. Consider the followingi
"In Brady, the Supreme Court held "the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where
the evidence is material.either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." 373 U.S. at 87, 83
s.ct·. 1994. In Giglio, the Supreme Court extended this principle to
include evidence that impeaches a witnessi-s credibility. 405 U.S. at
154, 92 s.ct. 763."
"There are three elements of a Brady/Giglio violation? "(l) the evidence
at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is
exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; (2) that evidence must have
been suppressed by the St-ate, e-\ t-her wilfully or inadvertently: and (3)
prejudice must have ensued." United States v. Williams, 547 F-3d 1887,
1202 (9thCir •. 2008) (quoting Strickler v. Green~,·· 527 u..:s. 263,281-32, 119
S.• ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)}."
"Evidence is prejudicial or material "only if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the
result of the proceeding would have been different." United states v.
Bagley, 473 u.s. 667,682, 105 s.ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). There
is a "reasonable probability" of prejudice when suppression of evidence
"undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial." kyles v. Whitley,
514 u.s. 419,434, 115 s.ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 {1995)(citing Bagley,
473 U.S. at 678, 105 s.ct. 3375). But a "reasonable probability" may be
found "even where the remaining evidence would have been sufficient to
convict the defendant." Jackson, 513 F.3d at 1071 (citing Strickler, 527
u.s. at 290, 119 s.ct. 1936)."
"Suppressed evidence is considered rcollectively, not item by item."
Kyles, 514 u.s. at 436, 115 s.ct. 1555. If a reviewing court finds a
material Brady/Giglio violation, "there is no need for further
hannless-error review," Id. at 435, 115 s.ct. 1555. But if suppressed
evidence is trnerely cumulative," then the failure to disclose is not a
violation. Morris v. Ylst, 447 F.3d 735, 741 (9thCir. 2006)."
Of course, while Brady certainly applies under the circumstances described in
P_~itionerts case, it is also necessary for the petitioner to show materiality. The
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law in this regard is sufficiently set out in In Re Brown, 17 Cal.4th 873 (1998),
wherein the Court states as follows:

"The current standard of review for Brady materiality was first
articulated in Bagley, supra, 473 u.s. 667, although the United States
Supreme Court began developing it in earlier decisions. (See Agurs,
supra, 427 U.S. at p. 112 [96 s.ct. At pp. 2401-2402]: Giglio v. United
states, supra, 405 u.s. at p. 154 [92 s.ct. At p. 766].) Recently in
kyles, supra, 514 U.S. 419, the Court reemphasized four aspects
articulated in Bagley critical to proper analysis of Brady error. first,
" [ a] I though· the constitutional duty is triggered by the potential impact
of favorable but undisclosed evidence, a showing of materiality does not
require demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure of the
suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the defendant "s
acquittal (whether based on the presence of reasonable doubt or
acceptance of an explanation for the crime that does not inculpate the
defendant). [Citations.] Bagley"s touchstone of materiality is a
"reasonable probability" of a different result, and the adjective is
important. The question is not whether the defendant would more likely
than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether
in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trail resulting
in a verdict worthy of confidence." (Id. at p. 434 (115 S.Ct. At pp. 1565
-1566].}"
.
"Second, "it is not a sufficiency of evidence test. A defendant need not
demonstrate that after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of
the undisclosed evidence, there would not have been enough left to
convict. The possibility of an acquittal on a criminal charge does not
imply an insufficient evidentiary basis to convict. One does not show a
Brady violation by demonstrating that some of the inculpatory evidence
should have been excluded, but by showing that the favorable evidence
could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light
as to undermine confidence in the verdict." (Kyles, supra, 514 u.s. at
pp. 434-435 [ll5 s.ct. At p. 1566], fn. Omitted.)"
·
"Third, "once a reviewing court applying Bagley has found constitutional
error there is no need for further harmless-error review." (Kyles, supra,
514 u.s. at p. 435 [115 s.ct. At p. 1566].) the one subsumes the other.
(Id. at PP· 435-436 [ll5 s.ct. At PP· 1566-1567].)"
"Fourth, while the tendency and force of undisclosed evidence is
evaluated item by item, its cumulative effect for purposes of materiality
must be considered collectively. )Id. at pp. 436-437 & fn. 10 [115 s.ct.
At p. 157]: See also Agurs, supra, 427 U.S. at p. 112 [96 s.ct. At p.
2402], fn. omitted [omission "must be evaluated in the context of the
entire record"].)"
"In Bagley, the court identified another relevant consideration in noting
that "an incomplete response to a specific [Brady] request not only
deprives the defense of certain evidence, but also has the effect of
representing to the defense that the evidence does not exist. In reliance
on this misleading representation, the defense might abandon lines of
independent investigation, defenses, or trial strategies that it
otherwise would have pursued." (Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at p. 682 [105
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s.ct. At p. 3384].) Given this possibility, "undr the [ "reasonable
probabilityt] fourmulation the reviewing court may-consider directly any
adverse effect that the prosecutor"s failure to respond might have had
on the preparation or presentation of the defendant •·s case. The
reviewing court should assess the possibility that such effect might
have occurred in light of.the totality of the circumstances and with an
awareness of the difficulty of reconstructing in a post-trial
preoceeding the course that the defense and the trial would have taken
had the defense not been misled by the prosecutorrs incomplete
'response." (Id. at p. 683 [105 S.Ct. At p. 3384]; See, e.g., payne,
supra, 63 F.3d at p. 1209.)
In the petitioner'"s case, the information set out in the attached Exhibit•·s
and Affidavit In Support, (Seei Exhibit## 50; 51: 52; 53; 54; 55; 56: 57; 58: 59;),
relating to the numerous state lab employee staff and managers alleged deceptive
practices was certainly relevant,

particularly with

respect

to

character

for

truthfulness. Had this information been know at the time of trial~ Petitionerrs
counsel would certainly have been permitted to cross-examine the states expert
witnesses about the deceptive conduct and challenge the integrity of the evidence
submitted·.

And,

there were no

presenting the evidence.
reason,

Also,

interests

outweighing

Petitioner .. s

if the District Court would have,

prevented Petitioner•·s counsel from cross-examining

the

interest

in

for whatever
states

expert

witnesses on the alleged deceptive behavior, the jury would not have had sufficient
information to assess their credibility, and the credibility of the evidence.
The alleged misconduct would have added an entirely new dimension to the
jury•·s assessment of the expert witnesses and evidence attested to by the. The
expert witnesses technically were the prosecution"s star witness, as they were the
one that could establish the most important element of the crime, i.e., that the
material that was allegedly in the possession of the Defendant was, indeed, illegal
substances. And as stated by the Kohring Courtz
"Impeachment evidence is especially likely to be material when it
impugns the testimony of a witness who is critical to the prosecutionts
case."
U.S. v. Kohring,

637

F.3d 895

(9thCir.2011) (quoting Silva v.

Brown,

416 F.3d

980,987 (9thCir.2005).
the fact is, had the evidence of the lab employees" conduct been disclosed,
there is at least a reasonable probability that the withheld evidence would have
altered at

least one

jurorts assessment

regarding

the

credibility

of

their

testimony. Based upon the above sections A. to F., and newly discovered information
and argument, it is clear th~ state has violated Brady/Giglio and consequently the
Petitioner•·s right to a fair trial and due processes.
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•

SELF INCRIMINATIOO' - FIFTH AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS

•

Petitioner has established in His Affidavit In Support,·Sectionrs One; Three;
Four; Five; and Six, and within the foregoing Issuers, that the state engaged in
numerous instances within the trial itself, and in particularly Closing Argument, of
violating Petitionerts right to remain silent. Examples of these followsr
1.) Through .soliciting improper answers from states witness (Silvester). A. "I asked
him if there were any drugs in
(TT.p.191.L-14-16). (NOTEz This is
stopped for a traffic violation as
2.) Allowing the jury to listen

the vehicle that I needed to be aware of."
not an appropriate question to ask a citizen
well).
to Petitioner,.s cormients to bystanders while

awaiting police action during stop, in spite of objectionsr (TT.p.251.L-19)(part of
it stated that Petitioner was taking a drug class) (the states response to the
objection wasz "As to cumulative, I believe that the best evidence for this jury is
the Defendants,. own words himself. ,i) (TT.p.332.L-11-13).
3.) Submitting to the jury probation violation allegations, before any due process
was afforded. (not until July 24, 2009-Six months after the trial). e.g., alleged
dirty urinalysis for methamphetime, in_an unconnected case; using the allegations to
impeach through motion; getting the probation violation and it rs allegations
judicially noticed in the present case; falsely informing the jury that the previous
conviction was for possession with intent to deliver, when it was in fact for
possession only; telling the jury that Petitioner was familiar with illegal
controlled substances, and on probation for possession, (TT.p.172.L-2-6); Attacking
Petitionerts family· and friends, accusing them of being in the drug world,
(TT.p.912.L-5-10);. Accusing Petitioner of collusion, without foundation, evidence,
or proof, (TT.p.941.to p.962); Accusing Petitioner of speeding (when no citation or
due process was ever afforded for such an allegation, (TT.p.960.L-23-25);
4.) Admonishing and condemning Petitioner to the jury for not testifying and
explaining away the allegations and the evidence, (TT.p.962.L-5-7; TT.p.953.L-24-25;
p.952.L-23-25); Accusing Petitioner of being untruthful, even under oath, (when he
never took the stand), and remained-·silent exercising his right to a fair trial and
fair due processes. (TT.p.997.L-24-25; TT.p.998.L-l-4); The state blames the
Petitioner

for

all

the

drug

problems

in

the

cornmuni ty

of

Twin

Falls,

(TT.p.998.L-7-25); The state tells the Court that the Petitioner is like a sex
offender, (TT.p.1006.L-20-22); And that the Petitioner endangers law enforc~µient
just by driving down the road,
o~iected to

k?x

('I'I'.p.1007.L-16-18).

The states comments were

the_~etitioner himself, preserving them for appeal.('I'I'.p.1017;p.1018)
-
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Petitioner respectfully refers the Court to Subdivision •·s A.; B.; and

c.

in

Issue Three, above for further argument on this claim, and argues the followingz
Petitioner argues that much of the evidence and statements made by the state
were inadmissible either as hearsay or non-hearsay purposes, after objections were
overruled on those-occasions where objection was made. All of it was highly unfairly
prejudicial, and lacked a proper foundation or none· at all. The evidence was not
helpful under Rule 701 or 702, in making a determination as to a fact in issue.

Seei

State v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 852,855 (Ct.App.1991): State v. Boehner, 114 Idaho 311
(Ct.App.1988).
Considering the inflammatory nature of the allegations and unsupported claims,
it would be impossible for this Court to conclude that any such errors in admitting
these statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Assuming, arguendo, that this Court finds the errors set forth in subdivision
A. thru G.

to have been individually harmless, Petitioner asserts that the errors

combined amount to. cumulative fundamental error. The cumulative error doctrine
refers to an accumulation of irregularities, each of which alone might be harmless,
but when aggregated, show the absence of a fair -trial in contravention of the
Petitioner .. s constitutional right to due process. State v. Paciorek, 137 Idaho
629,635 (Ct.App.2002). In order to find cumulative-error, this Court must first
decide that there is merit to more than one of the claims of error before
determining whether these errors, when aggregated, denied Petitioner a fair trial.
State v. lovelass, 133 Idaho 160, 171 (Ct.App.1999). Under the cumulative error
doctrine, even when individual errors are deemed harmless, ah accumulation of such
errors may deprive~ defendant of a fair trial. State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445,453
(1994).
Based on the fact that countless errors occurred in Petitioner"s trial, the
doctrine of cumulative error can be applied, and, in light of the other extraordinary prosecutorial misconduct occurring, reversal of the convictions with a new
trial is warranted. The argument and authority in support of the asserted errors are
set forth in subdivision's A thru G, above, and Issues,. One, Two, Four, Five, and
Six, and are incorporated herein by reference.
Petitioner argues that the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
states, "No person •• shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
hin:iself[.]" .u.s.c.A.Const.Amend.

v. Similarly, the Idaho Constitution guarantees

that "[nJo per~on shall •• be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself[.J 11 ·Idaho Const. Article I, § 13.
·----- - 35
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Petitioner asserts that it was fundamental error in violation of His Fifth
Amendment rights when the state elicited testimony concerning his pre-arrest
silence, His post-arrest invocation of His right to remain silent and to counsel and
due processes, and when,

in thier closing argument made numerous comments

on

His silence and allegatioins never admitted into evidence or true at all.
The law in idaho is well-established that a defendantrs Fifth Amendment right
not to have thier silence used against them in a court proceeding is applicable
pre-arrest and pre-Miranda warnings. State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814,820 {1998). And
also to post-arrest requests for counsel and due process requests. State v. Dearman
422 p.2d 573,575 (Kan.1967). Evidence disclosing that one charged with a crime has
asserted his constitutional rightrs cannot be used against him substantively as an
admission of guilt. It is reversible error to permit a jury to draw an inference
adverse to one accused of a crime from his reliance upon his constitutional rights.
The states comments on Petitionerrs silence violated the rule that in "[i]n a
criminal case, a prosecutor may not directly or indirectly comment on a defendant rs
invocation of his constitutional right to remain silent, either at trial or before
trial, for the purposes of inferring guilt. 11 State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82,86
(Ct.App.2007)(citations omitted).
The states broad scope of questions regarding Petitionerrs lack of statments,
or the states inferrences to guilt of uncharged, unconvicted crimes, and unproven
acts were completely unnecessary, and could have been avoided had the prosecutor
simply avoided asking questions that were likely to result in inadmissible testimony
and evidence, and, again, resulted in the admission of both that was improper and in
violation of Petitioner•·s Fifth Amendment rights. State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho
53,61 (2011).
Considering the clarity of the law on this subject, along with the fact that
there could have been no reasonable strategic basis for defense counsel not to have
objected, in those instances failing, it is clear that the error was plain, and
fundamental. Whether there is a reasonable possibility that the misconduct affected
the verdict, or reasonably could have affected the verdict, this has been
established through the statements themselves, and there can be no doubt as to their
prejudicial nature and impact. The three-prong test of State v. Perry is therefore
met. See, State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 {Idaho 2010).
Petitionerrs argument regarding prosecutorial misconduct at sentencing is
asserted and argued in Issue Five, below.
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STANDARD OF REVThW JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT

•

Petitioner points out that in reviewing a discretionary decision, the Court
considers?

(1)

Whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of

discretion; (2) Whether the court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and
consitently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) Whether
the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho
225,228, 178 P.3d 28, at 31 {2008). The Court must give adequate notice of specific
deficiencies in defendantts evidence or legal analysis, and must properly state the
grounds for dismissal. Griffin v. State, 142 Idaho 438, 128 P.3d 975 (2006).
Petitioner argues that pursuant to Idaho code § 19-2101; Order of Trial z 1.
The indictement is read; 2. The State opens; 3. The Defense opens; 4. The parties
may then respectively offer rebutting testimony only, unless court, permit them to
offer evidence upon their original case •••• 6. The judge must then charge the jury
if requested by either party; he may state the testimony and declare the law, but
must not charge the jury in respect to matters of fact. Pursuant to

r.c.

§ 1-1802 "A

judge cannot act as attorney or counsel in a court in which he is judge, ••• (Seez
What amounts to practice of law within contemplation of constitutional or statutory
provision, 106 A.L.R. 508).
Issues presented by conflicting witnesses and the credibility of the witnesses
are for resolution by the Jury. State v. Peterson, 81.". Idaho 147, 391 P.2d 846
(1994). Testimony of a witness raising questions as to the c~edibility and weight to
be given

their

testimony

are matters which are exclusively for

the

juryrs

determination. State v. Gee, 93 Ida.ho 636, 470 P.2d 296 (1970).

Petitioner argues that rrf there are facts in dispute or in conflict which
raise a genuine issue as to whether a witness is indeed an accomplice, the court
must submit that issue to the jury for resolution.r State v. Ruiz, 115 Idaho 12, 764
p.2d 89 (Ct.App.1988); State v. Brooks, 103 Idaho 892, 655 .P.2d 99 (Ct.App.1982) •.
They jury is entitled to believe or disbelieve the testimony or any portion of the
testimony of a witness. State v. Bedwell, 77 Idaho 57, 286 P.2d 641 (1955); State v.
Johnson, 77 Idaho 1, 287 P.2d 425 (1955), cert.denied, 350

u.s.

1007, 76 s.ct. 649,

100 L.Ed. 869 (1956); State v. Anderson, 82 Idaho 293, 352 p.2d 972 (1960); State v.
Gish, 87 Idaho 341, 393 P.2d 342 (1964).
(See:

Idaho Const., Article I, § 7. And Pursuant to I.e. § 2-104: "A trial

jury is a body of men or women, or both, returned from the citizena ••• sworn to try
,determine by a verdict a question of fact." Formation of a jury, I.c.§§19-1905, and
I.e.§ 19-1908).
37

I .

•

EVIDEN'l'IARY DETERMINATIONS FOR JURY

•

Petitioner argues that the Rules of Evidence in civil actions are applicable
also to criminal actions, except as otherwise provided in Idaho Code § 19-2110.
Therefore, evidence corroboration of an accomplice need only

connect

the

accused

with the crime, it may be slight, and need only go to one material fact or it may be
entirely circumstantial. State v. McC~ndles, 70 Idaho 468, 222 P.2d 156 (1950);
:J.!!! J./f6
State v. Bassett, 86 Idaho 277, 385 P.@D ~ (1963). The testimony of a witness
corroborating another person and himself in a crime, that exonerates the accused is
admissible. State v. Cacavas, 55 Idaho 538, 44 P.2d 1110 (1935).
·Petitioner argues that where the witness made unequivocal statements that he
assisted in the use and transport of ddrugs and willfully participated in them,
although they were not his drugs concerning which Petitioner was charged,

the

witness was an accomplice. And therefore the district court erred in allowing the
jury to pass on accomplice issue, where it had appeared without substantial conflict
in the testimony. State _v. Emmons, 94 Idaho 605, 495 P.2d 11 {1972).
The Petitioner, having denied that he was involved in the crime, raised a
direct conflict in the evidence on the issue of whether or not adverse witness was
an accomplice, and the trial court should have submitted that issue to the jury.
State v. Lucio, 99 Idaho 765, 589 P.2d 100 (1979).
Furthermore, in regards to the Petitioner'"s culpability, "some .aiding,
abetting or actual encouragement in the person '"s part is essential to make that
person an accomplice and mere acquiescence in, or silent consent to the corrmission
of an offense on the part of a bystander, is not sufficient to make one an
accomplice. Where there was evidence presenting the issue as to whether a witness
was an accomplice, the Petitioner was entitled to have His theory of the case
submitted to the jury upon proper instructions, testimony, and evidence. State v.
Gonzales, 92 Idaho 152, 438 P.2d 897 (1968).
Petitioner argues that it was improper for the Court to take the deposition of
Robert Berry, outside the jury, when he was readily available for testimony before
the jury, suppress substantial relevant parts of it, and suppress his affidavit.
Idaho statutes dealing with depositions clearly are conditionally prescribed. If
Berry was unavailable there would be grounds for a deposition, however, he was
clearly in custody and the process was orchestrated to prejudice Petitioner. Seez
Idaho Code§§ 19-3101: 19-3102; 19-3103; 19-3107; 19-3111; and r.c. § 3112.
Whatever the courts and states opinion was of the witnesses knowledge or .
claim, it was for the jury to decide the truth of the facts, all the facts.

•1

)

38

'
'

.

.J

J.

•

CO'IPOLSORY PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE SIXTH AMENDMEN'l'

•

Petitioner argues that the United States Constitution "s Sixth Amendment, In
pertinent part, that clause reads that

11 [

i] n all criminal prosecutions, the accused

shall enjoy the right ••. to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor •••• "
Writing for the majority,

Chief Ju.stice Warren held

that the compulsory

process guarantee is so fundamental that it is incorporated in the due process
provision of

the . Fourteenth Amendment.

The guarantee is therefore enforceable

directly against the states. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, at 16-17 n.4, 87
s.ct. 1920 at 1922 n.4, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019, at 1022 n. Chief Justice Warren assertedt
"The Framers of the Constitution did not intend to comnit the futile act
of giving to a defendant the right to secure the attendance of witnesses
whose testimony he has no right to use." Washington, 388 U.S. at 23, 18
L.Ed.2d at 1025, 87 s.ct. at 1925. The Chief Justice declared1 "This
Court had occasion in In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948), to
describe ••. the most basic ingredients of due process of lawz "A person "s
right to reasonable notice of a charge against h_im, and an opportunity to
be heard in his defense - a right to his day in court - are basic in
our system of jurisprudence: and these rights include, as a minimum, a
right to examine the witnesses against him [and] to offer testimony.",
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their
attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a
defense, the right to present the defendant"s version of the facts as
well as the prosecution "s to the jury. so it may decide where the truth
lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution ,.s
witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the
right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is
a fundamental element of due process of law."
Based on this reasoning, the Court-granted the accused a general "right to put
on the.stand a witness who [is] physically and mentally capable of testifying to
events that he [has] personally observed, and whose testimony would have been
relevant and material to the defense. Washington, 388 U.S. at 18-19. See Alsoz
Hoeffel, The Sixth Amendment ts Lost Clause: Unearthing Compulsory Process,

2002

Wis.L.Rev. 1275,1299 n. 111 (in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56 n. 13, 94
L.Ed.2d 40, 56. n. 13, 107 s.ct. 989,1000 n. 14 (1987), "Justice Powell, who wrote
the opinion in Chambers, ••• cites Chambers as a Compulsory Process Clause case").
Petitioner argues that The Supreme Court has ruled that a judge"s exclusion of
critical

exculpatory

hearsay

evidence

is

a

constitutional

violation

of

the

accuaed"s right to present witnesses in his own defense. The Court thus refused to
apply the right only to competency rules altogether barring a witnesst testimony:
the court extended the right to evidentiary rules that have the more limited effect
of ~reventiri~_ a_witness fr~. giving _partic_ular testiJ'!}ony, which Cp.Il de11_y tbE;_acctJ.eed

,z )
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a trial in accord with .•• due process. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, at
302, 35 L.Ed.2d 297, at 312-313, 93 s.ct. 1038, at 1049 (1973).
For a review of Supreme Court decisions concerning a criminal defendant '"s
constitutional right to obtain witnesses in his/her favor, Seel Accused'"s Right,
Under Federal Constitution 1·s Sixth Amendment, to Compulsory PROCESS for Obtaining
Witnesses in Accused'"s Favor -- Supreme Court Cases, 98 L.Ed.2d 1074 (1990). See
Alsoz Lewis, The Accused'·s Constitutional Right to Defend, 12 The Advocate at 299
(1980)(focusing on Washington v. Texas, 388

u.s.

14, 87

s.ct.

1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019

(1967)).
Petitioner has made a forthright claim of innocence. An innocent prisoner
seeking relief should do so. Seez Comment, Federal Habeas Corpusz The Relevance of
Petitioner 1·s Innocence, 46 UMKC.L.Rev. 382 (1978). See alsoi Peller, In Defense of
Federal

Habeas

Corpus

Relitigation,

16

Harv.Civ.Rts.--civ.Lib.L.• Rev.

579

(1982) (presenting an extensive arg'ument in favor of post-conviction review). See
alsoz Actual Innocence - Teague Doctr~ne.
Petitioner argues that.he has made a comprehensive showing that His right to
hae the jury decide the truth and His

fate was

stolen away by impropriety,

misconduct, and numerous constitutional violations, that are so blatant, it shocks
the conscience, and puts to shame the ethics of justice in the principle case. The
trial court put itself above the jury, stripped the jury and defendant of their
rights, and regressed due process back to the dark ages of.Jnquisitionalism. And it
is the type of judicial misconduct that strangles and paralyzes the State and
Federal Constitutional Protections, hard fought for, of the citizens of this state
and country, and must not and should not be sustained in this State, or this case.
These cl~ims were brought to the attention of the appellate public defenders
office in detail. Their refusal to address the issue on direct appeal prejudiced
the Petitioner, but pursuant to procedural regularity, where he has proven that he
requested the issues to be broyught, submitted a supplemental rpo se brief when
counsel refused to, and was refused by the clerk· due to appointed counsel, there
can be no procedural bar to the presentation and review of these claims. They have
been preserved,

and presented here with diligence,

with

integrity,

and with

constitutional right to do so. The evidence suggest even more so, a procedural
remedy affordable in this forum, collateral proceedings under post-conviction.
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WAS PETITIONER ''S RIGHT ts TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WITH RIGHT •·s
'ID JURY TRIAL, EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW, PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESSES, AND RIGHT
TO BE FREE FROM CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT, VIOLATED WHEN THE COURT AND
THE STATE, IGNORED THE JURY ts VERDICT, REACCUSED PETITIONER OF INTENT TO
DELIVER, PREJUDICING HIM AT SENTENCING, INFLICTING DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTz PURSUANT TOI u.s.C.A.CONST.AMEND. V; VI; VII;
VIII; AND XIV § I; AND THE IDAHO STATE CONBSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, §§ l; §7;

§8; §13; and §18?
The Petitioner asserts Yes!

(Petitioner respectfully refers to His Affidavit In Support of Petition For
Post-Conviction Relief; with Exhibit •·s
thru #94; and all those Transcripts and
Clerk•·s Record mentioned therein, as_ if fully stated herein. (Exhibit ts Attached)
{Seez Affidavit Sections, Three; Four; Five; and Six)

n

A.

CAUSE OF ACTION

Petitioner claims the trial Court violated His right to be from from Do~le
Jeopardy by ignoring the juryts ver,dict of possession of a controlled substance, and
reaccu.sing Him of possession with intent to delvier, at sentencing.
Petitioner claims the court violated His right to be free from Double Jeopardy
by reaccusing Him of possession with intent to deliver in the previous case,
CR-04-2929, when he was only found guilty of possession of a controlled substance.
Petitioner claims the trial Court prejudiced the jury by informing them He was
previously found guilty of Possession with Intent to Deliver in the previous· case,
when in fact it was only possession.
Petitioner claims the trial Court abused its discretion, and inflicted cruel
and unusual punishment upon Petitioner when it sentenced Him to Ten (10) years to
Life based upon an assessment of possession with intent to deliver, where He had
never been convicted of said crime.
Petitioner claims the trial Court violated His right to fair due processes and
equal protection of law when it reaccused Him of Intent To Deliver, in any context,
where the jury ignored the charge and acquitted Him of it.
Petitioner claims the trial Court violated His constitutional protections and
due process of law by ac~using Him at sentencing and submitting to the jury, crimes
and allegations He was never convicted of, and no·evidence was provided to support
such allegations. e.g., See1 Affidavit In Support).
Petitioner claims His rights enumerated above were violated th~ough the state
engaging in those same acts and allegations the trial Court cormnitted, at sentencing
and throughout the trial, so stated in the seven paragraphs above.
reacc~ing Him of possession with intent

to deliver;

dealing

Including,

drugs;

witness
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intimidation; collusion; and lying. Using such allegations to prejudice Him at
sentencing and with the jury.
Petitioner claims the trial Court and State prejudiced Him at sentencing
through condemning and admonishing Him for asserting His right to remain silent, and
right to fair due processes and right to jury triali The State going so far as to
state; (" •• , if the defendant had accepted responsibility ••• " "admitted that he
was,.possessed •• drugs

with

the

intent

to

deliver

them ••• we •• temper

our

recommendation ••• ")~ Violating those rights so enumerated above.
Petitioner claims that although counsel made some objections to the statments
above, counsel was far from effective in protecting Petitionerrs rights against such
acts, and appellate counsel refused to raise the issues at all on direct appeal,
violating Petitioner•·s rights to effective assistance of counsel in both instances.
B.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Idaho Supreme Court rs general objectives when reviewing a Trial court •·s
sentencing are to correct a sentence which is excessive in length, to facilitate the
rehabilitation of the offender, to promote respect for law by correcting abuses of
the sentencing power and by increasing the fairness of the sentencing process, and
to promote criteria for sentencing which are both rational and just. State v.
Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 908 P.2d 566 (1995).
A clear abuse of discretion is shown if the defendant establishes that,
considering the sentencing objectives, the sentence is excessive under any
reasonable view of . the facts. State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141,145, 814 P.2d
401,405 91991), overruled on other grounds, State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 336, 825 P.2d
482 (1992). A prosecutorts or courtrs distortion of the reasonable doubt burden of
· proof is an ei-ror of fundamental proportions because it goes to the foundation of
the case. State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758,769, 864 p.2d 596,607 (1993). An error
is not harmless if the "record contains evidence that could rationally lead a
finding for the defendant with respect to the omitted element. Neder v. U.S., 527
U.S. 1,19 (1999); State v. Hickaman, 146 Idaho 178,182, 191 P.3d 1098,1102 (2008).
The reviewing court cond~cting the harmless-error inquiry does not "become in effect
a second jury to determine whether the defendant is guilt." Neder, 527 u.s. at 19,
citing R. Traynor, The _Riddle of Harmless Error 50 (1970). Instead, "the reviewing
court must ever bear in mind that criminal defendants have a constitutional right to
have a jury, not judges, or sentencing court judges on review, decide guilt or
innocence." State v. Johnson, 98 P.3d 998,1003 (N.M.2004).
The State or Trial judge may not consider a defendantts silence or refusal to
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admit guilt with respect to uncharged or dismissed crimes in response to a direct
request from the State at the sentencing hearing. State v. Heffern,

130 Idaho

946,950 P.2d 1285 {Ct.App.1997) •. Admonition during sentencing violates Idaho Code§
19-30031 ,.that a defendant ,.s refusal to testify may not prejudice him or be used
against him in a criminal proceeding. rstate v. Anderson, 130 Idaho 765, 947 P.2d
1013 9Ct.App.1997). "A clear abuse of discretion may be shown, and such an abuse o.f
discretion. may be found if the sentence imposed is shown to be unreasonable upon the
facts of the case. _Subjecting a defendant to postacquittal .factfinding proceedings
going

to guilt

or

innocence violates

the Double Jeopardy Clause." Smalis

v.

Pennsylvania, 476 u.s. 140,145, 106 s.ct. 1745,1749, 90 L.Ed.2d 116,122 (1986).
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that no
person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or

limb." The Clause affords.a defendant three basic protections. It protects against a
second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, a second prosecution for
the same offense after conviction, and multiple criminal punishments for the same
offense. Schiro v. Farley, 510 u.s. 222,229, 114 s.ct. 783,788-89, 127 L.Ed.2d 47,56
(1994): State v. McKeeth, 136 Idaho 619,622, 38 p.3d 1275,1278 (Ct.App.2001);
C.

IXXJBLE JEX>PARDY ANALYSIS AT SEN'l'ENCING

Petitioner argues that "The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment
prohibits reexamination of an acquittal by a jury verdict." Smith v. Massachusetts,
543 U.S. 462,467,

125 S.Ct.

1129,1133,

160 L.Ed.2d 914,922

(2005).

A verdict

constitutes an acquittal if it "actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of
some or all of the factual elements of the offenses charged." Id. at 468, 125 s.ct.
at 1134, 160 L.Ed.2d at 923 (quoting U.S. v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S.
564,571, 97 s.tt. 1349,1355, 51 L.Ed.2d 642,650-51 (1977)). What matters is that the
jury evaluated the evidence and determined that it was legally insufficient to
sustain a conviction. Id. at 469, 125 s.ct. at 1135, 160 L.Ed.2d at 923-24. As
noted, double jeopardy bars reexamination of a court decreed acquittal to the same
extent as an acquittal by jury verdict. Smith, 543 u.s. at 467, 125 s.ct. at 1133,
160 t.Ed.2d at 922-23.
The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that if an acquittal has
occurred, double jeopardy bars a retrial even if the acquittal was entered because
of an error of law by the trial court. The Supreme Court heldz •• "[T]he fact that
•·the

acquittal

may

result

from

erroneous

evidentiary

rulings

or

erroneous

interpretations of governing legal principles•· ••• affects the accuracy of that
determination, but it does not alter its essential character." U.S. v. Scott, 437
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82,98, 98 s.ct. 2187,2197, 57 L.Ed.2d 65[79](1978)

(quoting id., at 106, 98

s.ct., at 2201[57 L.Ed.2o, ·at 83-84] (BRENNAN, J., dissenting))."Thu.s, this Court ts
cases hold that an acquittal on the merits bars retrial even if based on legal
error." Arizona v. Rumsey,

467 U.S.

203,211,

104 s.ct.

2305,2310,

81

L.Ed.2d

164,171-72 (1984).
Petitioner argues that double jeopardy bars a retrial even i~ the trial court ts
acquittal was based upon a

mistake

in determining

the degree of recklessness

necessary to sustain a conviction. Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140,144 n.7, 106
s.ct. 1745,1748 n.7, 90 L.Ed.2d 116,121 n.7 (1986). It is clear in the principle
case that the Court and the State, violated the Juryts Sovereign Veredictum: and the
Petitioner~s Vested Right to Substantive Law.
When a defendant has been acquitted at trial he may not be retried on the same
offense, even if the legal .rulings underlying the acquittal were erroneous. Sanabria

v. u.s., 437 U.S. 54,64, 98 s.ct. ·2170,2179, 57 L.Ed.2d 43,63-64 (1978); U.S. v.
Blanton, 476 F.3d 767 (9thCir.2007); U.S. v. Ogles, 440 F.3d 1095 (9thCir.2006);
State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706,716-18, 69 P.3d 126,136-38 (2003).
Petitioner points out that in the principle case, "The verdict was made upon
the facts and
therefore,

evidence given to

profoundly represents a

offenses charged." see, u.s.

the

jury as

they determined

resolution of

the factual

v. Scott, 437 u.s. 82,97,

the truth,

and

elements- of the

98 s.ct.

2187,2197,

57

L.Ed.2d 65,78 (1978), quoting u.s. v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564,571, 97
s.ct. 1349,1355, 51 L.Ed.2d 642,650-51 (1977).
'l'.he Idaho Supreme Court, in State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 716-717, 69 P.3d
126,136-137 (2003), heldz "The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that~ no person shall be "subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb." Similarly, Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution
provides that "[n}o person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense."
Jeopardy attaches in a jury trial when the jury is impaneled and sworn. State v.
Santana, 135 Idaho 58,64, 14 P.3d 378,384 (Ct.App.2000)."
Petitioner argues that it was not for the Court and the State to inflict a
higher degree of guilt upon the Petitioner. When ·it appears that a defendant· has
committed a public offense, and there is reasonable ground of doubt in which of two
or more degrees he is guilty, he can be convicted of the lowest of such degrees
only. State v. Koho, 91 Idaho 450,

423 P.2d 1004 (1967) (SeeAlsoi

Idaho Code §

19-2105). Furthermore, whenever a crime is distinguished into degrees the jury, if
they convict·the defendant, must find the degree of the crime of which he is guilty.
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Seet Idaho Code § 19-23ll. Also, A general verdict upon a plea of not guilty is
either "guilty" or "not guilty" which imports a conviction or acquittal of the
offense charged in the indictment. seer Idaho Code§ 19-2305. and when there is a
verdict of conviction, in which it appears to the court that the jury have mistaken
the law, the court may explain the reason for that opinion and direct the jury to
reconsider their verdict, and if, after· the reconsideration, they return the same
verdict, it, must be entered; but when there is a verdict of acquittal, the court
can not require the.jury to reconsider, it. Seez Idaho Code§ 19-2314.
Petitioner argues that the Double Jeopardy Clause encompasses the corollary
doctrine of collateral estoppel. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,444-45 (1970).
Developed in civil litigation, collateral estoppel , has become an established
component of federal criminal law and is embodied in the Fi~th Amendmentrs guarantee
against double jeopardy. Id. Collateral eatoppel "means .simply that when an issue of
ultimate fact has once been deteI1I1ined by a valid and final judgment, thqt issue
cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit." Id. at
443., Id. at 446; See, e.g., u.s. v. Ford, 371 F.3d 550,555-56 (9thCir.2004}
( collateral estoppel bar to prosecution for intent to distribute drugs because
defendant's previous acquittal relied on same fully-litigated facts).
D.

MDLTIPLE ENHANCED PENALTIES PRODIBrl'ED

Petitioner respectfully points out that1 1. He was charged with and sentenced
under Idahors Persistent violator enhancementz Idaho Code§ 19-2514; And alsot 2.He
was charged with and sentenced for Idahors Second. Offense, Unifonn Controlled
Substances Actz Idaho Code § 37-2739; Andz 3. He was charged with, convicted and
sentenced for Possession Of a Controlled Substancez Idaho Code§ 37-2732(c)(l).
PetitionE!r argues that He has been subjected to Double Jeopardy; Multiplicity;
Cruel and Unusual Punishment; and that, Idahors statute on the prohibition against
multiple enhanced penalties has been violated. The Petitioner argues that it was not
the intent of the legislature in r.c. § 37-2739, "Second offense of the Act," to
enhance an individuals sentence for simple possession.(and/or if it was, it violates
double jeopardy clause.) _
Petitioner argues that. a reading of Idaho Code§§. 37-2739; § 37-2739A; and I.e.
§ 37-2739Bz are consistent in their references to, Trafficking; Delivery; Intent To

Deliver; and Manufacturing. None of which the Petitioner points out, has He ever been
convicted of. Furthennore, more importantly& r.c. § 37-2739 statesz
subject to a fixed minimum term under section 37-2739B,"

11 • •

,who -· is not

Petitioner points out that the Court and state, as indicated at sentencing, dia
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reaccuse and reindicte Him with renewed allegations of Intent to Deliver, (when HE
had been acquitted of that charge on all counts), and also accused Him of other
allegations not even introduced into evidence, and than enhanced His sentence with a
Fixed Minimum of Ten (10) years to Life on all counts. Even doing so in case No1
CR-04-2929, (in that it was submitted to the jury as intent to deliver as a matter
of record using

r.c.

§ 37-2732(a)), and· also submitted at sentencing as Intent To

Deliver as the facts establish.
The Petitioner.Points out that the State and Court~s comments at sentencing and
to the jury clearly showi Prejudice; Bias; Denial of Due Processes; Double Jeopardy;
and disregard for judicial ethics. They in fact are subjecting the Petitioner to
punishment and enhancements conducive to

I.e.

§§ 37-2739A, 37-2739B, and therefore

inappropriate pursuant to the wording of the statute itself, and those
constitutional protections enumerated above.
Petitioner points out that· pursuant to r. C. § 19-2520E, it states 1
"Notwithstanding the enhanced penalty provisions in section 19-2520, 19-2520A,
19-2520B and 19-2520C, Idaho Code, any person convicted of two (2) or more
substantive crimes provided for in the above code sections, which crimes arose out
of the same indivisible course of conduct, may only be subject to one (1) enhanced
penalty."
Petitioner argues that clearly, multiple enhancements are illegal and also
improper, and considering that the Petitioner has never either been accused, charged
nor convicted of any kind of sex offense whatsoever, the States prejudices, and the
Courts concurrences, to such allegations, and the application of I.e. §§
19-2520(A)(B) or (C), are wholly without any merit, law, or justification.
Petitiomfr argues that out of fairness to the accused, "criminal statutes are
strictly construed in their substantive elements and in their sanctions." State v.
MCKaughen, 108 Idaho 471,473, 700 P.2d 93,95(Ct.App.1985)(citing State v. Thompson,
101 Idaho 430, 614 P.2d 970 (1980)).
Additionally, "ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be
resolved in favor of lenity." McKaughen, 108 Idaho at 473, 700 P.2d at 95 (citing
Rewis v.

u.s.,

401 U.S. 808,812, 28 L.Ed.2d 493, 91 s.ct. 1056 (1971); Thompson, 101

Idaho at 437, 614 P.2d at 977). Sentencing is a matter generally committed to the
discretion of the trial judge. State v. Pratt, 125 Idaho 594,600, 873 P.2d 848,854
(1994); State v. Jones, 125 Idaho 477,489, 873 P.2d 122,134 (1994); State v. Brown,
121 Idaho 385,394, 825 P.2d 482,491 (1992).
Petitioner argues that the Court in His case abused it~s discretion, and the
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State overreached itrs authority and power in charging the indictment with multiple
enhancement rs, and abused Petitioner rs rights with improper inferences of other
crimes and their relationship to mandatory minimum enhancements and harsh punishment
State v. Evans, 107 Idaho 429, 690 P.2d 364 (Ct.App.1984); State v. Johns, 112 Idaho
873, 736 P.2d 1327 (1987): State

v.

Custodio,

136

Idaho 197,

30 P.3d

975

(Ct.App.2001). An original sentence imposed on a defendant which containes two
separate enhancements is invalid since it violates I.C. § 19-25208: State v. Searcy,
118 Idaho 632, 798 .P.2d 914 (1990} modified on other grounds, 124 Idaho 107, 856
P.2d 897 (Ct.App.1993) 120 Idaho 882, 820 P.2d 1239 (Ct.App.1991).
Petitioner argues that this presents an issue of statutory construction, a
question of law which is subject to free review. City of Sun Valley, 128 Idaho
219,221, 912 P.2d 106,108 (1996); Harris v. Dep•·t. of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho
295,297, 847 P.2d 1156,1158 (1992). The interpretation of a statute begins with. an
examination of its literal words. In re Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho.819,823, 828
P.2d 848,852 (1992): Ada County. v. Gibson, 126 Idaho 854,856, 893 P.2d 801,803
(Ct.App.1995). Where statutory language is unambiguo~s, the clearly expressed intent
of the legislature must be given effect, and there is no occasion for a court to
consider rules of construction. Wolfe v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 128 Idaho 398,404,
913 P.2d 1168,1174 (1996).
Petitioner asserts that it has been settled throughout our history that the
constitution protects every criminal defendant "against conviction except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which
he is charged," In re Winship, 397 u.s. 358,364, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 90 s.ct. 1068
(1970). It is equally <::lear that the "Constitution gives a criminal defendant the
right to demarid that a jury find him guilty of all the elements of the crime with
which he is charged." U.S. v. Gaudin, 515 u.s. 506,511, 132 L.Ed.2d 444, 115 s.ct.
2310 (1995). These basic precepts, firmly rooted in the common law, have provided
the bssis for decisions interpreting modern criminal statutes and sentencing
procedures.
In Apprendi v. New -Jersey, 530 u.s. 466, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, 120 s.ct. 2348
(2000), the Supreme Court heldi "Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the presecribed statutory maximum must
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.-, at 490, 147
t.Ed.2d 435, 120 s.ct. 2348. In Ring v. Arizona, 536 u.s. 584, 153 L.Ed.2d 556, 122
s.ct. 2428 (2002), the Court reaffirmed their· conclusion that the characterization
of critical facts is constitutionally irrelevant. "If a State makes an increase in a
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defendantrs authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact -no matter how the State labels it - must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt." Id., at 602, 153 L.Ed.2d 556, 122 s.ct. 2428.
For the reasons explained above, the requirement of the Sixth Amendment are
clear. The application of the trial courts sentencing scheme violated the
Petitioneri-s right to have the jury find the existence of "any particlular fact"
that the law makes essential to his punishment. Blakely v. Washington, 542
u.s._,at_, 124 ~-Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ea.2d 403(slip op., at -5). The right is implicated whenever a judge seeks to impose a setnence that is not solely based on "facts
reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant." Id., at__ , 124 s.ct.
2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403(slip op., at 7). the Supreme Court precedents make clear "that
the •·statutory maximum r for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a juoge may
impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by
the defendant." Ibid. 124 s.ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (slip op., at ?)(emphasis in
origi!"}al).
Petitioner argues that more importantly than the language used by the Supreme
Court rs holding in Apprendi are the principles they sought to vindicate. Those
principles are unquestionably applicable. they are not the product of recent
inovations in our jurisprudence, but rather have their genesis in the ideals our
constitutional tradition assimilated from the comnon law. Jones v. U.S., 526 U.S.
227, at 244-248, 143 L.Ed.2d 311, 119 s.ct. 1215. The Framers of the Constitution
understood the threat of "judicial despotism" that could arise from "arbitrary
punishments upon arbitrary convictions" without the benefit of a jury in criminal
cases. The Federalist No. 83, p.499 (C. Rossiter ea. 1961) (A. Hamilton). The
Founders presrlmably carried this concern from England, in which the right to a jury
trial had been enshrined since the Magna Carta. As was noted by the Supreme Court in
Apprendii
"The historical foundation for our recognition of these principles extends
down centuries into the common law. 'To guard against a spirit of
oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers,r and ras the great bulwark
of [our] civil and pplitical liberties,r trial by jury has been understood
to require that rthe truth of every accusation, whether preferred in the
shape of indictment, information, or appeal, should. afterwards be
confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of [the defendant"s] equals
and neighbors ••• "" 530 u.s., at 477, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, 120 s.ct. 2348
(citations omitted)."
Regardless of whether the legal basis of the accusation is in a statute or in
guidelines promulgated by an independent commission, the principles behind the jury
tria~_;!ght a:e equally applicable.
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The Petitioner has shown that His speedy trial rights were waived by the court,
not Him, and not for any just cause. Furthermore, if this Court determines there was
some, unknown justification, which Petitioner asserts there is not, for the waiver,
there can be no justification for the continuance, postponement, and a further six
month delay, once Petitioner reported for court the day before the trial was to
begin. The prejudice asserted is profound, turned the course of the trial, and was
measurably damaging to Petitionerrs defense, witnesses, and evidence. Also, the
manner in which the right was waived, contrary to judicial integrity, prejudice may
be presumed, for both manner of implementation - and length of delay. To detennine
otherwise would make meaningless the requirement of "expressly waived in person" and
completely change the injustice defined by "fundamental error." Seei Klopfer v.
State of North Carolina, 386 u.s. 213, 87 s.ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d l (1967); and State
v. Lindsay, 96 Idaho 474, 531 P.2d 236 (1975). See Alsor Issue Two; Affidavit § 2.
The Petitioner has shown that the both the Suppression hearing Court ..s and the
Trial Court's findingts of fact regarding the illegal-pretextual stop of Petitioner
are erroneous. And the the officers lied, submitted false affidavits of probable
cause, mishandled the evidence, and than the state withheld the video of the stop
and conmplete transcript of the audio, intentionally, to deny Petitioner exculpatory
evidence that proves beyond a doubt the lies and misconduct. Without the video, this
Court has the officer .. s own words, on record that they were stalking Petitioner and
did so until they could fabricate a reason to pull Him over and search Him. All of
which is contrary to constitutional principles, well founded and recognized, which
constitutional principles, should have guided the suppression court and trial court
*
to establish that Petitioner '"s fundamental rights were violated long before now.
See1 Taglavore v. United states, 291 F.2d 262 (9thCir.1961): Henry v. United States,
361 u.s. 98, 80 s.ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959): State v. Lafferty, 139 Idaho 336,
79 P.3d 157 (Ct.App.2003); State v. Schevers, 132 idaho 786, 979 P.2d 659
(Ct.App.1999). See Alsoz Issue One; and Affidavit Section One.
The Petitioner has shown that His Fifth Amendment Right to be free of self
incrimination was violated multiple times, on multiple levels. Furthermore, the
state engaged in prosecutorial misconduct that cannot be denied, prejudiced the
jury, created fundamental constitutional error, and denied Petitioner a fair trial
in any context. Petitioner concludes that the unethicle, gross misconduct of the
states prosecutor•·s is so unusually improper and inadmissable, that it serves to
also prove the complete ineffectiveness of counsel in application to this case.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF
1'\.ppel 1.,rnt p.:-ays

this

Ho.:-iorab1.e

Court

will

vacate

the

cinviction

and

aen::ence in thi::i cas,: ~·1d set th,e matter for a new trial;
In the Al tec,a ti ve, ,\ppellant pray,:, this Cc>urt will v-:1.cate the judg,ement of
convictio.1 -md s·en':2nce. and dism.Lss the :~ase entir,~ly.
l'i..nd grant ,Fr/ and s·1ch ot!"ler relief this CoJn: de,:ms just a,1a necessary
,1,1J.er the d.r.c1mst:1.nces.

Petitioner/Appellant Prose
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